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CHAIR'S FOREWORD 
 
Contemporary law enforcement agencies face considerable challenges brought about 
by greater mobility of people, goods and services across designated borders, improved 
communications and information technologies, and the emergence of a globalised 
economy. The transnational nature of organised crime means that in the commission 
of their crime, criminal networks forge bonds across geographical borders, transcend 
linguistic and cultural barriers and operate across markets. In Australia, the operations 
of organised criminal entities are fluid, adaptive and transcend borders, sectors and 
crime types.  
 
As serious and organised crime in Australia exploits the legislative, structural and 
resource gaps in law enforcement, it demands a nationally consistent approach. It also 
requires strategic investigative methodologies focused on intelligence-led 
investigations as well as identifying sector vulnerabilities open to exploitation in order 
to prevent and disrupt serious and organised crime rather than relying on reactive 
policing.  
 
As the national criminal intelligence body, the central function of the Australian 
Crime Commission (ACC) is to collect, analysis and disseminate criminal intelligence 
in relation to nationally significant organised crime. Its modus operandi is to work in 
partnership with law enforcement, national security agencies, government and 
industry to deliver advanced criminal intelligence. Recent amendments to the 
Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 have allowed for greater dissemination of 
ACC information to partner agencies, government and the private sector. However, 
evidence to the committee suggests that the intention behind these new arrangements, 
which is to provide for a more comprehensive response to organised crime, cannot be 
fully realised until existing limitations, challenges and hurdles within the current 
criminal intelligence framework are addressed.  
 
This inquiry has brought to light serious legislative, technological, resource and 
cultural impediments to the flow of intelligence which produce unequal intelligence 
holdings, an incomplete picture of criminal threats and undermine stakeholder 
confidence. Some law enforcement agencies hold reservations about sharing their own 
information and seem not to recognise the value added to that information when 
converted into intelligence and returned to them. Such concerns are exacerbated by 
the absence of a common approach to collecting, collating, analysing and 
disseminating criminal intelligence underpinning a common ethos. Efforts to establish 
an interoperable criminal intelligence system capable of producing a comprehensive 
national picture of organised crime are hindered for these reasons.  
 
In late 2012, a proposal for the establishment of an Australian Criminal Intelligence 
Model (ACIM) was endorsed by all 15 ACC Board agencies together with CrimTrac 
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and the Australian New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency. Viewing criminal 
intelligence as a national asset which can be collected once and used often, the ACIM 
seeks to establish an interoperable system for the free flow of criminal intelligence 
based on consistent standards, processes and protocols.  
 
The ACIM brings together for the first time the siloed domains of serious and 
organised crime, national security, and policing and community safety. By bringing all 
agencies involved in each of the respective domains under the one model and enabling 
them to draw on intelligence across all three domains, the initiative seeks to provide 
for a safer Australia. The efficacy of a centralised multi-sector criminal intelligence 
system was most recently highlighted in relation to the ongoing investigation into the 
Boston explosions of 16 April 2013. Investigations into criminal acts of this nature 
extend beyond any single domain or agency as they encompass matters of national 
security and counter-terrorism, organised crime as well as policing and community 
safety. As contemporary crimes can traverse the three domains, contemporary law 
enforcement must also be able to traverse available intelligence across the respective 
domains. The ACIM envisages an intelligence partnership whereby law enforcement 
agencies collect and contribute intelligence to the national holdings. This partnership 
is complemented by various national strategic frameworks and plans including the 
Commonwealth Organised Crime Strategic Framework which underscore the 
importance of an intelligence-led multi-agency response to organised crime.  
 
In this report, the committee considers some of the key challenges to establishing the 
ACIM. It examines the current criminal intelligence context and stakeholders. It 
explores the vision and principles that underpin the ACIM and highlights some of the 
key considerations before the ACC in establishing an interoperable system that all 
Commonwealth, state and territory law enforcement agencies contribute to and benefit 
from. Conceptualising intelligence as a national asset raised questions regarding 
controls on information sharing and access, including overall responsibility for and 
ownership of the intelligence. In this report, the committee makes a number of 
recommendations to ensure that all agencies are accountable for information and 
intelligence contributed to the national holding while ensuring that there are strong 
accountability and oversight arrangements as well as standards in relation to 
intelligence gathering and sharing.  
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendation 1 
5.44 The committee recommends that the Australian Crime Commission and 
the Australian Federal Police provide it with a detailed report on the findings 
and recommendations of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Database (ACID) 
and Australian Law Enforcement Intelligence Network (ALEIN) scoping study, 
National Information and Intelligence Needs Analysis, and assessment of the 
AFP's Project Spectrum. The report should provide details on: 
• the recommendations regarding ACID and ALEIN and how they will be 
implemented including a timeframe;  
• the outcome of the National Information and Intelligence Needs Analysis; 
• the assessment of the AFP's Spectrum Program; and  
• how the recommendations of each respective review and assessment will 
inform the development of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Model 
and maximise interoperability between existing databases and systems. 
Recommendation 2 
5.45 The committee recommends that the Australian Crime Commission 
(ACC) as the lead agency on criminal intelligence and the Australian Criminal 
Intelligence Model (ACIM) provide it with a report on how the ACC will ensure 
that all current information technology systems are fully utilised and accessible 
under the ACIM.  
Recommendation 3 
6.10 The committee recommends that the Australian Criminal Intelligence 
Forum (ACIF) develop for the endorsement of all 17 Australian Criminal 
Intelligence Model agencies an information management strategy. As a first step 
in developing the strategy, the ACIF should define key terms including a clear, 
working definition of criminal intelligence and provide descriptions of relevant 
concepts and processes. 
Recommendation 4 
6.20 The committee recommends that the Attorney-General's Department 
conduct a review of disclosure of information procedures under Freedom of 
Information (FOI). The review should provide recommendations on any 
legislative, administrative or policy reforms required to achieve a consistent 
approach to FOI requests for information under the Australian Criminal 
Intelligence Model.  
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Recommendation 5 
6.21 The committee recommends that the Attorney-General's Department 
review law enforcement data security management practices, standards, 
principles and safeguards. The review should provide recommendations on: 
• standards and uniform principles for the security and integrity of 
information contributed to the Australian Criminal Intelligence Model 
(ACIM). These standards should detail how ACIM agencies are to hold, 
protect, secure and manage ACIM intelligence; and  
• an accountability and oversight mechanism to monitor compliance with 
the uniform standards and principles.  
Recommendation 6 
6.34 The committee recommends the establishment of a national repository for 
criminal intelligence as part of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Model.  
Recommendation 7 
6.35 The committee recommends that a cost-benefit analysis be undertaken in 
relation to the options for a national repository. This analysis should take into 
consideration: 
• the determining factors detailed in Chapter 6 of this report;  
• the need to complement existing information technology initiatives such 
as the AFP's Spectrum Program; 
• the need for interoperability and complementarity with current 
databases including the National Criminal Investigation DNA Database 
and the National Automated Fingerprint  Identification System; and  
• the intelligence sharing model used by the Australian intelligence 
community.   
Recommendation 8 
6.42 The committee recommends the standardisation of security clearance 
processes. To this end, the committee strongly encourages all state and territory 
jurisdictions to align their security clearance processes with that of the 
Australian Government Security Vetting Agency.  
Recommendation 9 
6.55 The committee recommends that the Australian Crime Commission in 
collaboration with the Attorney-General's Department establish as part of a 
licencing requirement to the national repository or other administrative 
arrangement, a formal agreement which requires signatory agencies to declare a 
commitment to contribute information and intelligence to the national holdings.  
Recommendation 10 
6.56 The committee recommends the establishment of an accountability and 
oversight regime to ensure that agencies are accountable for their contribution to 
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the national holdings. As part of this regime, the Senior Officers' Group on 
Organised Crime (SOG on OC) should provide an annual oversight report to the 
Ministerial Council for Police and Emergency Management—Police and 
Standing Committee of Attorneys-General on the contribution of each respective 
agency for review and remedial action where required.  
Recommendation 11 
6.71 The committee recommends that the feasibility of extending the 
jurisdiction of the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity 
(ACLEI) to include oversight of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, the Attorney-General's Department and the Australian Taxation 
Office be referred to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ACLEI for inquiry 
and report.  
Recommendation 12 
7.15 The committee recommends that the Australian Crime Commission 
provide a detailed account of progress towards the Australian Criminal 
Intelligence Model in its annual reports. 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 1 
The terms of the inquiry 
1.1 On 30 May 2012, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement 
(the committee) initiated an inquiry into the capacity of the Australian Crime 
Commission (ACC) and Australian Federal Police (AFP) to gather, use and share 
criminal intelligence to reduce the threat and impact of serious and organised crime. 
Under the terms of reference, the committee was required to consider the:  
a. role and objectives of the ACC within the context of the National Security 
Framework; 
b. ACC's criminal intelligence collection capability, including resourcing, 
expertise, powers, and criminal intelligence community networks; 
c. adequacy of the ACC's criminal intelligence holdings; 
d. availability and accessibility of ACC's criminal intelligence; and  
e. interoperability of Australian law enforcement agencies in relation to criminal 
intelligence holdings. 
Conduct of the inquiry  
1.2 The inquiry was advertised in The Australian and through the Internet. The 
committee invited submissions from Commonwealth, state and territory law 
enforcement agencies and interested organisations and individuals.  
1.3 The committee received 20 public submissions and three confidential 
submissions. A list of individuals and organisations that made public submissions to 
the inquiry, together with other information authorised for publication, is provided at 
Appendix 1. The committee held four public hearings in Canberra on 21 and 
27 September 2012, 31 October 2012 and 14 March 2013. Details of the public 
hearings are referred to in Appendix 2. The public submissions and Hansard transcript 
of evidence may be accessed through the committee's website at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=
le_ctte/index.htm  
Scope and structure of the report  
1.4 As a first step in the inquiry, the committee sought to understand the current 
criminal intelligence landscape in Australia and found that involved agencies apply a 
range of models, systems and approaches to criminal intelligence. In addition, each 
state and territory jurisdiction is at a different stage in the evolution towards 
intelligence-led policing.  
1.5 The current fragmented approach is contrasted by the proposed Australian 
Criminal Intelligence Model and supporting strategy which seeks to provide a 
framework to harness and share intelligence assets. Moving from the current system to 
a national model will require effort to address considerable legislative, technological 
and cultural obstacles. In considering the current context and the proposed model, a 
2  
 
number of key issues of concern to stakeholders came to light. These matters are 
explored in the report. Reflecting this approach, the report is divided into chapters as 
follows:  
 Chapter 2—conceptualising 'criminal intelligence'; 
 Chapter 3—the Australian Crime Commission and the national criminal 
intelligence context; 
 Chapter 4—current information and intelligence sharing arrangements and the 
current technological, legislative, resource and cultural barriers to greater 
information and intelligence sharing; 
 Chapter 5—the Australian Criminal Intelligence Model and supporting 
strategy; 
 Chapter 6—challenges to an Australian Criminal Intelligence Model; and 
 Chapter 7—committee view and conclusions.  
Acknowledgement 
1.6 The committee thanks those organisations and individuals who made 
submissions and gave evidence at the public hearings. The committee would like to 
particularly thank the Chief Executive Officer, Mr John Lawler AM APM, and 
officers of the ACC for their cooperation during the course of this inquiry.  
 
  
 
CHAPTER 2 
Conceptualising 'criminal intelligence'  
2.1 On 17 May 2012, the Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Justice, The 
Hon. Mr Jason Clare MP stated that '96 per cent of drug seizures come from 
intelligence from law enforcement agencies before the parcel or container even arrives 
in Australia'.
1
 Recognised as an 'integral part of the fight against crime', criminal 
intelligence leads to seizures of illegal goods and arrests of criminals'.
2
 Furthermore, 
criminal intelligence can:  
…enhance national understanding about what criminal activities and illicit 
markets are impacting on Australia, who is committing these nationally 
significant crimes, and the nature of potential future threats.
3
  
2.2 Effective and meaningful sharing of information across agencies and 
jurisdictions is critical to the production of useful, accurate and timely criminal 
intelligence which is the 'lifeblood of any effective response to serious and organised 
crime'.
4
 However, challenges in relation to criminal intelligence came to prominence 
in 2008 when the National Security Statement expanded the concept of national 
security to include serious and organised crime for the first time. This expansion 
coincided with a growing body of evidence highlighting the need for greater 
consistency in information management arrangements across the Commonwealth and 
state and territory jurisdictions to address organised crime.
5
   
2.3 The 2008 Review of Homeland and Border Security (which informed the 
2008 National Security Statement) noted the following in relation to serious and 
organised crime:  
The current arrangements for coordinating Commonwealth efforts and 
priorities are limited. There are some gaps in national efforts, such as 
limited sharing of police capabilities and case management databases, and 
more attention could be given to criminal intelligence collection and 
analysis. A strategic framework for Commonwealth efforts in relation to 
                                              
1  The Hon. Mr Jason Clare MP, Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Justice, 'Better 
intelligence leads to record seizures', Media release, 17 May 2012, 
http://www.ministerhomeaffairs.gov.au/Mediareleases/Pages/2012/Second%20Quarter/17-
May-2012---Better-intelligence-lead-to-record-seizures.aspx (accessed 16 August 2012).  
2  Mr John Lawler, CEO, ACC, quoted in 'Better intelligence leads to record seizures', Media 
release, 17 May 2012.  
3  Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2011–12, p. 31.  
4  Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 1.  
5  Mr Ric Smith AO PSM, Report of the Review of the Homeland and Border, Summary and 
Conclusions, 4 December 2008, presented to the Australian Government on 27 June 2008, 
http://www.dpmc.gov.au/national_security/docs/20081204_review_homeland_security.pdf 
(accessed 31 July 2012).  
4  
 
serious and organised crime should be developed for consideration by 
government.
6
  
2.4 The 2008 National Security Statement echoed these concerns and identified 
the need for a national security framework which would provide for enhanced 
coordination across Commonwealth agencies.
7
 Fragmentation across intelligence 
communities and siloing of intelligence into 'policing', 'national security' or 'private 
sector' intelligence were some of the challenges identified.
8
 Following the security 
statement, Mr John Lawler, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the ACC, the 'national 
criminal intelligence agency', noted that 'we are aligning the ACC Board approved 
national criminal intelligence priorities with the broader national intelligence 
priorities'.
9
 
2.5 In 2009 and 2010, a series of policy documents were developed to enable a 
comprehensive response to serious and organised crime of which the November 2009 
Commonwealth Organised Crime Strategic Framework (OCSF) is the primary 
document. The OCSF outlines the key threats from organised crime and provides a 
framework for a whole of government response to address them. The ACC was 
involved in the development of the framework. According to the Attorney-General's 
Department (AGD), sharing intelligence is the 'central plank of the OCSF' and a vital 
part of the fight against organised crime.
10
  
2.6 While much has been achieved in developing cooperative relationships, 
governance frameworks and information sharing arrangements between 
Commonwealth, state and territory agencies involved in the fight against serious and 
organised crime since the establishment of the ACC, serious issues and challenges 
remain. Evidence to the committee has highlighted a series of legislative, 
technological, conceptual, methodological and cultural impediments to achieving an 
integrated intelligence sharing system underpinned by a common agenda.  
Definition of 'criminal intelligence' 
2.7 The committee found that there is no commonly agreed definition of 'criminal 
intelligence'. The Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (ACC Act) includes no 
definition of 'criminal intelligence'. While a 'healthy discussion persists' amongst 
                                              
6  Mr Ric Smith AO PSM, Homeland and Border Security Review, Summary and Conclusions, 
4 December 2008, presented to the Australian Government on 27 June 2008, 
http://www.dpmc.gov.au/national_security/docs/20081204_review_homeland_security.pdf 
(accessed 31 July 2012).  
7  The Hon. Mr Kevin Rudd MP, Prime Minister, House of Representatives Hansard, 4 December 
2008, p. 12555, 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2F
hansardr%2F2008-12-04%2F0045%22 (accessed 15 August 2012).  
8  Mr Patrick F. Walsh, Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis, Routledge, 2011, p. 1.  
9  Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2011–12, p. 1; Australian Crime Commission, 
Annual Report 2008–09, p. 6. 
10  Mr Iain Anderson, AGD, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 18.  
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practitioners and others about the role of intelligence and intelligence analysis, 'we 
seem no closer to identifying what intelligence means more broadly now, a decade on 
from 9/11'.
11
  
2.8 Divergence in agreement and lack of clarity regarding a definition of criminal 
intelligence and what it entails has contributed to varying expectations about the 
purpose of criminal intelligence. This is reflected in the range of approaches to the 
gathering, use and sharing of information and intelligence across Commonwealth, 
state and territory jurisdictions. The committee set out to understand and compare 
information management systems and the processes applied by all involved agencies 
and the methodologies and approaches underpinning them. In pursuing this approach, 
the committee raised key questions about what distinguishes intelligence sharing from 
information sharing and the unique legislative, technological, resource or cultural 
challenges to sharing intelligence as opposed to sharing information.  
2.9 In seeking to establish clarity about how information and intelligence is 
gathered, used and shared across Australian jurisdictions and the challenges and 
shortcomings in doing so, the committee found that many witnesses did not 
differentiate the challenges in sharing intelligence and sharing information.
12
 Others 
highlighted the importance of a two-way flow of information and intelligence as 
explained by Mr Mark Burgess of the Police Federation of Australia (PFA):
 13
 
It works both ways. I use the example of a police officer who goes to what 
might generally be a minor incident but makes an intelligence report about 
that incident, perhaps relating to cars or individuals who were there. That 
little bit of information could perhaps link to a major investigation that is 
taking place—for example, a motor car outside a house that has not 
previously been linked to that location. That could help someone who is 
working on a major organised crime investigation at the level of the ACC, 
AFP or senior levels of police. So it does work both ways. The police and 
the agencies at the higher level will rely very heavily on information that 
will come in at the bottom level of police agencies and find its way up.
14
 
Defining 'criminal intelligence' and its purpose  
2.10 The committee established that there is broad agreement that criminal 
intelligence is information that is 'collected about crime and criminals and evaluated, 
analysed and disseminated'.
15
 In practice, therefore, intelligence-led investigations are 
distinct from traditional policing to the extent that the former considers the wider 
pattern of criminal behaviour in order to pre-empt criminal activity, rather than react 
to it. Traditional policing has the latter focus on solving specific crimes.  
                                              
11  Mr Patrick F. Walsh, Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis, Routledge, 2011, p. 1.  
12  Mr Mark Burgess, PFA, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 8. 
13  Mr Mark Burgess, PFA, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 8. 
14  Mr Mark Burgess, PFA, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 2. 
15  Law Council of Australia, Submission 6, p. 3.  
6  
 
2.11 The committee received evidence which asserted that intelligence is:  
 information that has been validated and value-added;
16
  
 information that has been analysed;
17
 and  
 not evidence.
18
 
2.12 Mr Ben McDevitt, the ACC's State Manager for Queensland explained that 
intelligence is usually an assessment rather than fact. As it is both unproven and often 
more complex than information or raw data, it requires more stringent protective 
security arrangements. The recently released Australian Criminal Intelligence 
Management Strategy which details the Australian Criminal Intelligence Model 
(ACIM) offers the following insight. It recognises 'criminal intelligence' as: 
…insights and understanding obtained through analysis of available 
information and data on complex offending patterns, serious organised 
crime groups or syndicates and individuals involved in various types of 
criminal activity.
19
 
2.13 While the process of intelligence gathering is different to that of information 
gathering, what distinguishes intelligence from information is the process of 
evaluation and analysis as articulated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime: 
INFORMATION + EVALUATION = INTELLIGENCE.
20
  
2.14 As many stakeholders did not distinguish information from intelligence, the 
committee asked the ACC to provide a definition of intelligence as distinct from 
information. The ACC provided the following definition of information: 
Information may be described as discrete pieces of data that may take the 
form of individual or collective numbers or text. When different types of 
allied information are synthesised they act as important building blocks in 
the intelligence process and are a critical precursor to an intelligence output 
(or product).
21
  
2.15 In contrast with information, intelligence is defined by the ACC as both a 
process and an output (product): 
                                              
16  Detective Superintendent John Pointing, Queensland Police Service, Committee Hansard, 
27 September 2012, p. 36; Mr Patrick Walsh, Committee Hansard, 31 October 2012, p. 2; Mr 
Doug Smith, CrimTrac, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 22.   
17  Mr Johann Visser, AUSTRAC, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 30. 
18  Mr Johann Visser, AUSTRAC, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 30. Mr John 
Lawler, ACC, Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Estimates 
Hansard, 12 February 2013, p. 81. 
19  Australian Criminal Intelligence Management Strategy 2012–15, tabled by the Australian 
Crime Commission at a public hearing on 14 March 2013, p. 3.  
20  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Criminal Intelligence: Manual for Analysts, 2011, 
p. 1.  
21  Australian Crime Commission, Answer to question on notice, No. 1, received 28 March 2013. 
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• As a process, intelligence involves the collection, processing, 
integration, evaluation, interpretation and analysis of available information. 
This process––typically referred to as the intelligence cycle––transforms 
information into insight or understanding using analysis, critical thinking 
and problem solving skills. 
• As an output, intelligence is obtained through the observation, 
investigation, analysis and understanding  which is then developed into a 
product and disseminated to support different levels of decision-making, 
which can be strategic, operational or tactical.
22
 
2.16 The ACC concluded that information is generally unprocessed, static and 
unique whereas intelligence is evaluated, dynamic, client focused and appropriately 
classified. In terms of an intelligence cycle and the interplay between information and 
intelligence, the ACC noted that: 
Information comes from a breadth of sources that are unclassified and 
classified as the starting point from which intelligence advice is generated. 
Creating and delivering intelligence involves the application of the 
intelligence cycle and analytic techniques which value-add to the 
information. Intelligence must answer a key intelligence question and 
provide decision makers with an advantage.
23
 
2.17 Intelligence is a complex concept because it can be described as advantage, 
insight or understanding on a current or future criminal threat, methodology, 
vulnerability or opportunity which is developed through the analysis of available 
information and provides direction for action. For this reason, its purpose can vary. It 
can target 'highest risk criminal targets and markets' as well as 'market and sector 
vulnerabilities open to exploitation by organised crime'.
24
 More broadly, it can 
improve the 'quality of tactical, operational and strategic decisions involving infinite 
resources'.
25
 In the realm of serious and organised crime, criminal intelligence is the 
'edge by which law enforcement collectively seeks to maintain the upper hand in 
countering criminal enterprise'.
26
 According to the ACC, all intelligence products 
'must have a client driven intelligence question, or gap on an unknown emerging 
threat, that is being answered, and a purpose'.
27
 At the same time, the extent to which 
criminal intelligence is used effectively is a reflection of various elements including 
how well the intelligence functional process is integrated into an agency's 
operations.
28
   
                                              
22  Australian Crime Commission, Answer to question on notice, No. 1, received 28 March 2013. 
23  Australian Crime Commission, Answer to question on notice, No. 1, received 28 March 2013.  
24  Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 11.  
25  Australian Graduate School of Policing Criminal Intelligence, 
http://www.csu.edu.au/faculty/arts/agsp/crimintell/index.html (accessed 27 July 2012). 
26  Mr Mark Geddes, ASIC, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 31.  
27  Australian Crime Commission, Answer to written question on notice, No. 1, received 28 March 
2013.  
28  Assistant Commissioner Timothy Morris, AFP, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 38. 
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Scope of information and complexity of the intelligence landscape  
2.18 The scope, volume and breadth of information generated and shared across 
law enforcement and Commonwealth agencies is reflected in the following evidence 
to the committee: 
 1382 requests for disclosures from law enforcement agencies were received 
by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) in 2011 which also provided 
100 self-initiated disclosures to other agencies. The ATO is currently 
experiencing a 22 per cent increase in the number of requests from law 
enforcement agencies.
29
  
 451 039 information and intelligence products were uploaded onto the ACC 
managed national Australian Criminal Intelligence Database (ACID) during 
2010–11. During the same period, there were 2775 active users of ACID who 
conducted nearly 560 000 searches for information.
30
  
 1.7 million individual searches of companies and corporate activity were 
conducted on the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 
database in 2010 by agencies including the Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority (APRA), Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 
(AUSTRAC), ACC, Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 
(ACBPS), ATO, Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP) and 
AFP.
31
  
 Over 200 million transactions were carried out on the AUSTRAC database by 
40 agencies legislated to access AUSTRAC's holdings of financial 
information and intelligence through its online system. AUSTRAC also 
disseminates 1400 value-added intelligence products annually and manages 
approximately 46 agreements with international jurisdictions to exchange 
information.
32
  
 Approximately 74 per cent of AFP information reports were provided to the 
ACC.
33
 
 An average of 16 000 requests for information are received by the Queensland 
Police Service annually.
34
  
                                              
29  Mr Greg Williams, ATO, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, pp 19–20. 
30  Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 21. 
31  Mr Mark Geddes, ASIC, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 31. 
32  Mr Johann Visser, AUSTRAC, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, pp 30–31. 
33  The remaining 26 per cent of information is either operationally sensitive or third-party caveat 
reports whereby information was provided by a third party with certain release restrictions 
(Assistant Commissioner Timothy Morris, AFP, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, 
pp 36 & 40).  
34  Acting Assistant Commissioner Gayle Hogan, Queensland Police Service, Committee Hansard, 
27 September 2012, p. 35. 
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 200 000 information reports were transferred by the NSW Police Force to the 
ACC in 2010 creating over one million new entities on ACID.
35
 
 50 000 items of information and intelligence were provided to ACID by the 
Tasmania Police over eight months in 2012.
36
 
2.19 These impressive statistics support the view that the level of cooperation and 
interoperability across the various jurisdictions and Commonwealth agencies is the 
'best it has ever been in the history of law enforcement in this country'.
37
 The volume 
of information alone demonstrates that Commonwealth, state and territory law 
enforcement agencies recognise the value of information sharing.
38
 Further, recent 
initiatives to establish coordinating bodies, committees and groups to identify and 
work through challenges to information and intelligence sharing is testimony to a 
genuine willingness to improve intelligence sharing practices.
39
  
Intelligence approaches, models, systems and expectations 
2.20 The committee noted the substantial contribution of the ACC to the criminal 
intelligence context and growing commitment of Commonwealth, state and territory 
law enforcement agencies to gather and share intelligence. However, evidence to the 
committee also highlighted the extent to which the national criminal intelligence 
landscape remains a patchwork of models and systems. This has contributed to a 
context in which, as Mr Lawler explained:  
…we are not always as well informed as the criminals we confront. It is 
true that we need to be smarter about how we share intelligence and more 
systematic and fulsome in that sharing process.
40
 
2.21 The challenges for involved agencies in establishing an interoperable national 
criminal intelligence system are exemplified by the fact that criminal intelligence is 
currently stored in more than 30 systems operated by Australian law enforcement, 
policing, national security and other government agencies. These systems have limited 
interoperability.
41
 Other challenges include the difficulties of working across different 
jurisdictions and legislative frameworks. Rather than have no meaning to organised 
                                              
35  Acting Deputy Commissioner David Hudson, NSW Police Force, Committee Hansard, 
27 September 2012, p. 27.  
36  Deputy Commissioner Scott Tilyard, Tasmania Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 
2012, p. 47. 
37  Acting Deputy Commissioner David Hudson, NSW Police Force, Committee Hansard, 
27 September 2012, p. 27.  
38  Acting Assistant Commissioner Gayle Hogan, Queensland Police Service, Committee Hansard, 
27 September 2012, p. 35.  
39  These include the Senior Officers' Group on Organised Crime which reports to ministers 
through the Standing Council of Police and Emergency Management (Mr Iain Anderson, AGD, 
Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 19).  
40  Mr John Lawler, ACC, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 42.  
41  Police Federation of Australia, Submission 7, p. 4. 
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criminal groups, geographical borders and state boundaries and differences in their 
respective legislation are exploited as loopholes.
42
 At the same time, the wider 
population is becoming more transient, as evidenced in the Northern Territory where 
50 per cent of the registered population do not reside permanently within the 
territory.
43
 These issues demonstrate the need for a consistent criminal intelligence 
model, system and approach that can be applied and used across the country. 
2.22 At the same time, greater sophistication of significant criminal activity has 
driven agencies such as ASIC and the ATO into playing an increasingly central role in 
the investigation and disruption of serious and organised crime. The primary customer 
of AUSTRAC intelligence, for example, is the ATO.
44
 However, given the fluidity 
and rapidly changing intelligence landscape, ASIC argued that its ability to give and 
receive intelligence has 'overtaken our legislated ability to a certain extent'.
45
  
2.23 The committee was informed that while a range of initiatives and measures 
have improved the ability of involved agencies to collaborate, information sharing 
between the ACC and other agencies has been a problem for a significant period of 
time.
46
 It was argued that the current criminal intelligence model is 'largely based 
around goodwill, with agencies contributing where they feel it appropriate, based on 
their own decision-making'.
47
 Even where concepts are universally agreed, such as 
with the establishment of a national DNA database, application across jurisdictions 
differs.
48
 At the same time, the technology underpinning Australia's national criminal 
intelligence holdings or ACID and the Australian Law Enforcement Intelligence 
Network (or ALEIN) is out-of-date and may require, according to the ACC's CEO, 
'potentially complete replacement'.
49
  
2.24 The lack of a consistent, nationally recognised definition of 'criminal 
intelligence' has contributed to varying expectations, standards and approaches across 
jurisdictions which has resulted at times in the duplication of effort.
50
 This situation 
coupled with limited interoperability across intelligence databases and systems, has 
created a patchwork of intelligence systems, approaches and models.  
                                              
42  Mr Mark Geddes, ASIC, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 33.  
43  Assistant Commissioner Reece Kershaw, Northern Territory Police, Committee Hansard, 
27 September 2012, pp 23–24.  
44  Mr Johann Visser, AUSTRAC, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 31.  
45  Mr Mark Geddes, ASIC, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 32.  
46  Acting Deputy Commissioner David Hudson, NSW Police Force, Committee Hansard, 
27 September 2012, p. 27. 
47  Mr Ben McDevitt, ACC, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 45.  
48  Acting Deputy Commissioner David Hudson, NSW Police Force, Committee Hansard, 
27 September 2012, p. 27.  
49  Mr John Lawler, ACC, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 43.  
50  Detective Chief Inspector Colin Cunningham, South Australia Police, Committee Hansard, 
27 September 2012, p. 38.  
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2.25 In order to meet the expectations of governments and communities regarding 
policing and community safety, better methods and interoperable systems to exchange 
information in a timely manner across all jurisdictions are needed.
51
 Many 
stakeholders also recognise the need to address the siloing of intelligence brought 
about by the separation of policing from the national security, and serious and 
organised crime domains.  
2.26 Mr Patrick Walsh emphasised the importance of a national intelligence model 
supported by national interoperable repositories of criminal intelligence: 
If you do not have a system that can adapt as the criminal environment 
adapts so that we are able to collect this intelligence at the state, local and 
federal regulatory agencies, if you do not have that baseline of some of 
these emerging threats—wherever it is—then how do you know what the 
environment is going to look like tomorrow…how do you know whether 
that is the door we should be bashing down tomorrow. Or, we should not be 
bashing that door down; we should be looking over at this area of the 
criminal environment to see that something is coming over our heads, and 
we are not aware of it because we do not have the storage capacity to have 
that information and we do not have a way to easily retrieve and analyse 
that information in real-time. So, it is critical that we develop a national 
intelligence model, which is underpinned by good systems products, by 
good information products. We have never quite got there in Australia, with 
that.
52
 
2.27 The extent to which the ability, desire and means to share criminal 
information, let alone intelligence are hamstrung by legislative restrictions, cultures, 
resource challenges and technological impediments is the subject of Chapter 4 of this 
report.  
                                              
51  Acting Assistant Commissioner Gayle Hogan, Queensland Police Service, Committee Hansard, 
27 September 2012, p. 35.  
52  Mr Patrick Walsh, Committee Hansard, 31 October 2012, pp 1–2.  
  
 
CHAPTER 3 
Australian Crime Commission and the national criminal 
intelligence context  
3.1 The ACC is the 'national criminal intelligence agency'. Its approach is to 
'work with partners to develop criminal intelligence' and to investigate, disrupt and 
prevent 'serious and organised crime threats of most harm to the community'.
1
  
3.2 This chapter provides an overview of the role of the ACC in relation to 
criminal intelligence and the ACC's intelligence gathering methods, powers and 
partners. The committee also considers the role of the ACC within the national 
security context and the ACC's role in providing national coordination in relation to 
criminal intelligence in the fight against serious and organised crime.  
Origins of the Australian Crime Commission  
3.3 A series of royal commissions in the late 1970s and early 1980s, including the 
Moffit, Woodward, Costigan, Stewart and Williams Royal Commissions, recognised 
the need for a standing royal commission to investigate serious organised crime. The 
National Crime Authority (NCA) was established in response to identified weaknesses 
in the capacity of traditional policing to combat sophisticated organised crime 
effectively.  
3.4 The NCA operated for 18 years before the introduction of the Australian 
Crime Commission Act 2002 (ACC Act) which established the ACC in 2003. During 
the parliamentary debate on the ACC bill, then Attorney General, The Hon. Daryl 
Williams, AM QC MP noted that the establishment of a national crime commission 
would improve criminal intelligence collection and analysis, set national criminal 
intelligence priorities and conduct intelligence-led investigations. In relation to this 
intelligence role, he explained that the ACC would:  
• provide a coordinated national criminal intelligence framework; 
• set national intelligence priorities to avoid duplication; 
• allow areas of new and emerging criminality to be identified and investigated; 
and 
• provide for investigations to be intelligence driven.2 
ACC criminal intelligence gathering methods and powers  
3.5 The ACC itself serves as the nexus between Australia's law enforcement, 
policing and national security agencies by facilitating the flow of criminal intelligence 
                                              
1  Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2011–12, p. 1.  
2  The Hon. Mr Daryl Williams AM QC MP, Attorney-General, House Hansard, 26 September 
2002, p. 7328.  
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across these domains.
3
 As criminal intelligence is the 'core business' of the ACC, it 
uses a range of methods to collect, use and share criminal intelligence drawing on a 
variety of sources including law enforcement, policing, national security, government 
and private sector bodies and its own investigations of organised criminal activity.
4
 It 
coordinates national information sharing and, while emphasising the importance of 
working in partnership to derive intelligence, the ACC also has the power to conduct 
its own operations and investigations.  
3.6 ACC intelligence is derived from information obtained through activities 
including the seizure of computer files, surveillance, telephone interceptions and 
covert human sources (informants) as well as answers received through the ACC's 
coercive examinations.
5
 The ACC 2011–12 Annual Report identified some of the 
information gathering methods utilised by the ACC during the year including:  
…through witnesses appearing at our coercive examinations, through 
surveillance, covert human sources (informants), documents, phone calls, 
computer forensics and financial analysis. We combine and analyse this 
source material to produce insightful intelligence about the nature, extent, 
impact and trends of serious and organised crime.
6
 
3.7 The ACC's criminal intelligence services are designed to provide relevant 
Commonwealth, state and territory stakeholders with the intelligence 'necessary to 
effectively and efficiently disrupt serious and organised criminal activity and reduce 
the vulnerabilities to the Australian community'.
7
  
3.8 The ACC was also recognised as providing a 'politically and jurisdictionally 
neutral focal point for the creation of joint task forces in areas that are not necessarily 
of interest or relevance to the AFP'.
8
 The ACC seeks to complement the respective 
roles of the AFP, state and territory police forces and provide an over-the-horizon 
view of organised crime. As both receiver and producer of criminal intelligence, the 
ACC noted the following in relation to its role:  
Criminal intelligence received by the ACC is analysed and considered in 
the context of other intelligence received from national sources, and is then 
transformed into value-added criminal intelligence products designed to 
provide ACC partners, including the private sector, with insight and 
                                              
3  Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 10. The ACC distinguishes 'law enforcement' 
from 'policing'. The former refers to Commonwealth law enforcement agencies and the later to 
state/territory police agencies.  
4  Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 3.  
5  Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2011–12, p. 60.  
6  Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2011–12, p. 30. 
7  Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2011–12, p. 32. 
8  Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission, Review of the Australian 
Crime Commission Act 2002, November 2005, p. 12, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=acc_ctte/
completed_inquiries/2004-07/acc_act02/report/report.pdf (accessed 14 August 2012). 
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actionable advice to support decision making. This includes advice on 
organised crime trends and methodologies, identified vulnerabilities, 
nationally significant criminal entities and emerging issues facing 
Australia.
9
  
3.9 The ACC provides specialist advice on the National Criminal Intelligence 
Priorities and the criminal threats and issues that the ACC Board considers to be a 
high priority. The priorities are informed by ongoing intelligence collection, 
assessment and harms monitoring, as well as consultation with the board and partner 
agencies. The priorities are also then used to inform the strategic direction and work 
priorities of the ACC.
10
 
3.10 Under the ACC Act, the ACC has a 'primary role in gathering, using and 
sharing criminal intelligence'. Section 7A of the Act specifies that the ACC will: 
(a) collect, correlate, analyse and disseminate criminal information and 
intelligence and to maintain a national database of that information and 
intelligence; 
(b) undertake, when authorised by the ACC Board, intelligence operations; 
(c) investigate, when authorised by the ACC Board, matters relating to 
federally relevant criminal activity;  
(d) provide reports to the ACC Board on the outcomes of those operations 
or investigations; 
(e) provide strategic criminal intelligence assessments, and any other 
criminal information and intelligence, to the ACC Board;  
(f) provide advice to the ACC Board on national criminal intelligence 
priorities; and 
(g) such other functions as are conferred on the ACC by other provisions of 
the ACC Act or by any other Act. 
3.11 Collaboration with partner agencies most commonly takes the form of multi-
agency task forces or joint investigations. Intelligence products produced by the ACC 
include the classified Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) documents which 
make up the ACC's 'Picture of Criminality in Australia' product suite that informs the 
ACC Board's decisions in relation to priority setting and allocation of resources.
11
 The 
'Picture of Criminality in Australia' assessments also informed the development of the 
Commonwealth Organised Crime Strategic Framework, law enforcement priorities 
and activities through the Organised Crime Response Plan. Other intelligence 
products include current and emerging issues reports and operational analysis to 
support ACC and partner decision-making as well as the National Criminal 
                                              
9  Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 15.  
10  Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2010–11, p. 43.  
11  Australian Crime Commission, Organised Crime in Australia 2011, p. 94.  
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Intelligence Fusion Capability (Fusion) reports, intelligence briefs and information 
reports.
12
  
Australian Crime Commission Board  
3.12 The ACC Board comprises 15 members, including the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) of the ACC, who is a non-voting member.
13
 The committee sought and 
received evidence from all agencies represented on the ACC Board for the purposes of 
this inquiry.  
Commissioner of the AFP – Chair of ACC Board 
Secretary, Attorney-General's Department (AGD) Commissioner, South Australia Police  
CEO, Australian Customs and Border Protection 
Service (ACBPS) 
Commissioner, Western Australian Police  
Chairman, Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) 
Commissioner, Tasmania Police  
Director-General of Security, Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) 
Commissioner, Northern Territory Police  
Commissioner, NSW Police Force  Assistant Commissioner, ACT Policing 
Chief Commissioner, Victoria Police  Commissioner of Taxation, Australian Taxation 
Office (ATO) 
Commissioner, Queensland Police Service  CEO, Australian Crime Commission  
ACC's coercive powers  
3.13 The ACC has special coercive powers to assist in the performance of its 
functions. These powers, which can only be exercised by an ACC examiner in the 
context of a special operation or special investigation approved by the ACC Board, 
include the capacity to compel a person to produce documents, to attend an 
examination and to answer questions. The ACC's coercive powers are reinforced by a 
number of offence provisions. Under the ACC Act, it is a criminal offence to fail to 
comply with a document production notice, to fail to appear at an ACC examination 
or to fail to answer questions. It is also an offence to provide false or misleading 
evidence or to obstruct or hinder the work of the ACC.  
3.14 When deciding whether coercive powers should be used, section 7C of the 
ACC Act states that the ACC Board must consider the effectiveness of investigative 
methods that do not involve the use of coercive powers before authorising their use. 
                                              
12  Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2011–12, p. 34. 
13  Australian Crime Commission, Board of the Australian Crime Commission Chair Annual 
Report 2010–11, p. 16, 
http://www.crimecommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/annual_reports/chair1011/ACC_C
hair_Annual_Report_2010_11.pdf (accessed 14 August 2012).  
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The ACC noted in its submission that coercive powers 'form a critical element of the 
ACC's intelligence collection capability, and provide a valuable source of 
intelligence'.
14
  
3.15 The use of coercive powers by the ACC was criticised in evidence to the 
committee. The Law Council of Australia raised a number of concerns in relation to 
the ACC's use of coercive powers noting that coercive powers 'enable the ACC to 
compel persons to provide information and they limit the application of common law 
rights such as the privilege against self-incrimination'.
15
 The council had concerns 
with sections 34A and 34D of the Act whereby a person refusing to answer questions, 
cooperate or produce documents or things at examination can also be referred to a 
proscribed court to be dealt with for contempt. Since contempt provisions were 
introduced into the ACC Act in February 2010, three proceedings have been 
undertaken whereby ACC examiners referred witnesses for contempt of the ACC. In 
all three instances, respondents pleaded guilty and were imprisoned for contempt.
16
 
3.16 During 2011–12, the ACC reported that 328 coercive examinations were 
conducted.
17
 Speed and Stracey Lawyers noted that while the ACC's 2010–11 Annual 
Report refers to its coercive powers 60 times, it is 'difficult to find any reference on 
the checks and balances that ACC deploys to ensure that it uses its powers in a lawful 
manner'.
18
 However, in its submission, the ACC acknowledged the importance of 
additional safeguards which exist in relation to coercive powers: 
Additional safeguards include the right to legal representation and the 
Examiner's power to direct that evidence not be disclosed in a way that 
could risk anyone's safety, reputation or fair trial.
19
 
3.17 The ACC commented that coercive examinations allow it to 'break the code' 
while providing witnesses with a level of protection against self-incrimination. The 
2011–12 Annual Report provides an insight into the impact of the ACC's use of its 
coercive powers:  
Through our special investigations and special operations we helped disrupt 
a total of 26 criminal targets, stop $67.71 million worth of drugs from 
hitting the streets, restrain $103.59 million of proceeds of crime, seize 
$5.47 million in cash, charge 97 people and convict 45 people. We 
conducted 328 coercive examinations and shared a total of 1884 
intelligence products with our partner agencies.
20
 
                                              
14  Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 12. 
15  Law Council of Australia, Submission 6, p. 8.  
16  Law Council of Australia, Submission 6, p. 8. See further Australian Crime Commission, Chair 
Annual Report 2010–11, p. 50.  
17  Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2011–12, p. 58.  
18  Speed and Stracey Lawyers, Submission 17A, p. 6.  
19  Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 12.  
20  Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2011–12, p. 58. 
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3.18 When asked by the committee about recent legal challenges to the ACC's 
coercive powers, Mr Lawler made the following observation: 
We find that criminals, often in concert, represented by singular counsel—
multiple organised criminal groups, particularly outlaw motorcycle gangs—
are challenging the commission's coercive powers. 
The truth is that they do not like the coercive powers. The coercive powers 
are a way of breaking their business model, and they do whatever they can 
to try to thwart that. Part of that is through challenges through the court.
21
  
3.19 In its 2011–12 Annual Report, the ACC stated that its coercive powers were 
used in relation to special intelligence operations which entail gathering intelligence 
around particular criminal activity to determine whether a special investigation is 
warranted. In 2011–12, five special operations were undertaken in relation to the 
following matters:  
High Risk and Emerging Drugs; National Security Impacts from Serious 
and Organised Crime; Making Australia Hostile to Serious and Organised 
Crime; National Indigenous Intelligence Task Force (Indigenous Violence 
or Child Abuse No. 2); and Child Sex Offences.
22
 
3.20 During this period, the ACC's coercive powers were used in combination with 
investigative tools (such as telephone intercepts, surveillance and controlled 
operations) during special investigations. Over the same review period, four special 
investigations were undertaken and designed to disrupt and deter criminal groups in 
areas including: High Risk Criminal Targets; Targeting Criminal Wealth; Established 
Criminal Networks–Victoria; and High Risk Crime Groups–South Australia.23 
3.21 The ACC Board also has the power to establish task forces and to determine 
whether their activities can or cannot involve the use of coercive powers. The ACC 
2011–12 Annual Report noted that the ACC supported four multi-agency task forces 
during the year including the Criminal Assets Confiscation Taskforce, Financial 
Intelligence Assessment Team (to combat financial crime committed by organised 
crime groups), Project Wickenby and Task Force Galilee (fraudulent offshore 
investment schemes).
24
 
ACC's information sharing powers  
3.22 The 2005 Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime 
Commission Review of the ACC recommended that the ACC and Attorney-General's 
Department (AGD) identify barriers to information sharing and where necessary, 
develop and implement regulatory or legislative remedies. The Commonwealth 
responded by prescribing a list of government agencies and amending the ACC 
                                              
21  Mr John Lawler, ACC, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 49. 
22  Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2011–12, p. 15. 
23  Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2011–12, p. 15. 
24  Australian Crime Commission, Annual Report 2011–12, p. 74.  
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Regulations 2002.
25
 According to the ACC, the Review of Information and 
Intelligence in the Aviation Sector conducted by Peter Ford in June 2006 also 
recommended that the ACC Act be amended to allow the ACC to communicate 
information to prescribed private sector organisations for the purposes of aviation 
security.
26
 In April and June 2012, the scope for information sharing by the ACC was 
widened under amendments to the ACC Act.
27
  
3.23 Section 59AA of the ACC Act allows the ACC to share information with a 
wide range of ministers and members of parliament, government bodies, foreign 
agencies and international bodies, as well as private sector stakeholders. The ACC 
recognised that the amendments and specifically the inclusion of private sector bodies 
as an opportunity to enable it and its partners to 'develop more effective and inclusive 
response strategies to break the business of organised crime'.
28
  
3.24 The Law Council of Australia raised concerns regarding the amendments to 
the ACC Act and specifically whether there are adequate protections in relation to 
sharing intelligence and whether they are adequately applied.
29
 The Law Council was 
particularly concerned with section 59AB which contains specific requirements in 
relation to the disclosure of personal information (within the meaning of the Privacy 
Act 1988) to a body corporate. The Law Council argued that while the ACC 
voluntarily complies with the Information Privacy Principles under the Privacy Act as 
far as possible, the 'Government should develop information-handling guidelines for 
the ACC as recommended by the Australian Law Reform Commission'.
30
 The Law 
Council argued that such guidelines would complement the requirements in section 
59AB.
31
  
3.25 The Law Council also raised concern with the way in which information 
collected by the ACC with the use of its coercive powers is shared: 
There is no derivative use immunity in relation to the further use of the 
information obtained through the use of coercive powers. The lack of 
derivative use immunity allows this information to be used to gather further 
                                              
25  Government Response to Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission 
Report, Review of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=acc_ctte/
completed_inquiries/2004-07/acc_act02/index.htm (accessed 12 September 2012).  
26  Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 8.  
27  The Crimes Legislation Amendment (Powers and Offences) Act 2012 which amends the 
Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 is based on a PJC-ACC recommendation in its 2005 
Review of the Australian Crime Commission Act. See also AGD, Submission 3, p. 2. 
28  Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 19.  
29  Law Council of Australia, Submission 6, p. 3. 
30  Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and 
Practice (ALRC Report 108), modified 19 July 2012, 
http://www.alrc.gov.au//publications/report-108 (accessed 12 September 2012).  
31  Law Council of Australia, Submission 6, p. 15.  
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information or evidence which can be used in criminal proceedings against 
the person who provided the information as a result of the use of the 
coercive powers.
32
  
3.26 The Law Council also reiterated its long standing concern that there has been 
'leakage' of the coercive powers to 'supplement ordinary police investigations and 
proceedings'.
33
 The Law Council expressed the view that evidence or information 
obtained pursuant to the coercive powers should be 'subject to more stringent sharing 
restrictions than evidence or information obtained through other means'. However, it 
also acknowledged that recent amendments to the ACC Act have 'clarified particular 
protections for the sharing of information and evidence obtained through the use of 
coercive powers'. Nevertheless, the Law Council was concerned that: 
…these protections are reliant on relevant assessments by the ACC's Chair 
or CEO and on relevant directions being given by examiners.
34
  
3.27 The Law Council also noted its concern with provisions in section 59AB 
which determine that the ACC CEO may disclose information to a private sector body 
corporate that is prescribed by, or included in, a class of bodies corporate prescribed 
by regulations. The Law Council referred to the Organised Crime in Australia report 
which underscored the importance of collaboration with the private sector in 
addressing particular areas of organised crime, such as money laundering. While 
recognising the need for such collaboration, the Law Council underscored the need for 
appropriate protections to be applied to information sharing with the private sector.
35
  
3.28 Similarly, subsection 59AA(2) allows the CEO to disclose ACC information 
to ASIO 'if the CEO considers it appropriate to do so', the information is relevant to 
security as defined in the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 and 
disclosure would not be contrary to a law of the Commonwealth, state or territory that 
would otherwise apply.
36
 The Law Council raised the issue of whether there are 
adequate protections in relation to such sharing and whether they are adequately 
applied.
37
  
3.29 In response to the concerns raised regarding information sharing powers, the 
AGD noted that the ACC has the power to share on the condition that a range of 
safeguards provided for in the legislation are met. Mr Iain Anderson, Acting Deputy 
Secretary of the AGD, emphasised that the ACC can share with corporate bodies that 
are prescribed. He further noted that implementation of practices to realise these 
powers was a matter for the ACC in terms of ensuring the safeguards are adhered to, 
                                              
32  Law Council of Australia, Submission 6, p. 3.  
33  Law Council of Australia, Submission 6, p. 8.  
34  Law Council of Australia, Submission 6, p. 8.  
35  Law Council of Australia, Submission 6, p. 15.  
36  Law Council of Australia, Submission 6, p. 15.  
37  Law Council of Australia, Submission 6, p. 3. 
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the nature of intelligence that the ACC may choose to share and the bodies they will 
share it with in any given situation.
38
  
3.30 In relation to the use of coercive powers by the ACC, the committee is 
mindful that the Administrative Review Council's 2008 report on coercive powers 
provides best-practice principles to ensure that agencies use their coercive powers 
effectively, efficiently and with due regard to individual rights.
39
 The 20 best-practice 
principles seek to balance agency objectives in using their coercive powers with the 
rights of those in relation to whom the powers are exercised. Taking into account 
these principles, the committee will continue to monitor the ACC's use of its coercive 
powers as part of its oversight role.  
3.31 The committee also appreciates that the concerns of the Law Council of 
Australia go to the challenges of appropriate handling and protection of intelligence 
that is shared. Notwithstanding this point, evidence to the committee also highlighted 
that frustrations expressed by involved agencies with delays in the production and 
sharing of intelligence are likely to 'worsen as the need for intelligence sharing with 
the private sector increases'.
40
 These are questions of central importance to the 
development of an Australian Criminal Intelligence Model (ACIM) which are 
discussed throughout this report.  
National coordination in relation to organised crime  
Commonwealth Organised Crime Strategic Framework  
3.32 The Organised Crime Strategic Framework (OCSF) establishes a whole-of-
government comprehensive and coordinated response to target the most significant 
threats from organised crime. Focused on Commonwealth responsibilities, the OCSF 
implementation is coordinated by the AGD which leads the development of the 
Commonwealth's organised crime policy. Oversight is provided by the Heads of 
Commonwealth Operational Law Enforcement Agencies.
41
 Complementary processes 
to provide for strong collaborative partnerships with state and territories include 
forums such as the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General (SCAG) and Ministerial 
Council for Police and Emergency Management—Police (MCPEMP) whose roles and 
contributions are affirmed in a National Organised Crime Response Plan (NOCRP).  
                                              
38  Mr Iain Anderson, AGD, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 21.  
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Agencies, Report no. 48, May 2008, 
http://www.arc.ag.gov.au/searching/Pages/Results.aspx?k=coercive%20powers (accessed 
26 March 2013).  
40  Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 22.  
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3.33 The OCSF articulates the critical role of ACC intelligence in supporting the 
Commonwealth's approach to serious and organised crime, recognising that the 
effectiveness with which the ACC can gather intelligence is central to the success and 
efficacy of the framework. A key element of the OCSF is the ACC's biannual OCTA 
as articulated by the AGD:  
The OCTA details the highest priority risks from serious and organised 
crime to inform better targeting of policy and operational response. The 
effectiveness of the OCTA rests on the ability of the ACC to effectively 
gather and synthesise criminal intelligence from a range of domestic and 
international sources.
42
  
3.34 The ACC's specific role in relation to the framework includes provision of 
leadership on criminal intelligence matters through production of the OCTA, as well 
as in developing and managing capabilities and structures, namely the Criminal 
Intelligence Fusion Capability (Fusion) and Organised Crime Intelligence Model 
otherwise referred to as the Australian Criminal Intelligence Model (ACIM).
43
  
3.35 There are five capabilities that underpin the OCSF and its objective of 
providing for a coordinated and targeted whole-of-government response to serious and 
organised crime. Capability 1—Intelligence, Information Sharing and Interoperability 
—which encompasses activities directed to improve information sharing between and 
amongst state, territory and Commonwealth agencies as well as industry and the 
private sector—is of immediate relevance to the committee's terms of reference. 
Capability 1.3 is to 'provide clarity and consistency of standards, processes and 
protocols for intelligence-led policing and law enforcement work to enhance the 
national picture of organised crime'. The ACIM which is discussed in Chapter 5 of 
this report is being developed in response to this capability. 
National Organised Crime Response Plan 
3.36 In 2009, Australian attorneys-general, through SCAG, agreed to a national 
response to combat serious and organised crime. In December 2010, the federal 
Attorney-General and Minister for Home Affairs and Justice, in conjunction with state 
and territory attorneys-general, released the NOCRP which brings together 'both 
justice and law enforcement aspects of a national response to organised crime in a 
single resource'.
44
 Developed to provide strategic principles and measures to better 
target the national organised crime environment, the national plan was designed to 
                                              
42  Attorney-General's Department, Submission 3, p. 1.  
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complement the Commonwealth Organised Crime Response Plan 2010–11 and 
existing state and territory crime strategies.  
3.37 The NOCRP facilitates a new level of multi-jurisdictional collaboration 
around a set of strategic principles, protocols and actions to provide a national 
response to organised crime including: 
 improving consistency of policies and legislation across borders to fight 
organised crime; 
 removing impediments to effective sharing of information and intelligence; and 
 targeting the priority organised crime risks identified in Organised Crime 
Threat Assessments. 
3.38 The purpose of the NOCRP in relation to criminal intelligence is to provide a 
national strategy for 'removing both capability gaps and impediments to inter-
jurisdictional collaboration and sharing of information and intelligence'.
45
 Led by the 
states and territories in partnership with the Commonwealth, the NOCRP recognises 
that the 'profile of organised crime and the threat levels of different crime types vary 
from one jurisdiction to another'.
46
  
3.39 Five strategies underpin the NOCRP including 'Strategy 2: Enhancing 
intelligence and information sharing' which provides measures to:  
 improve the prioritisation and coordination of organised crime intelligence and 
operational matters;  
 support interoperability of resources and capabilities between jurisdictions; and 
 support, at a national level, the ACC’s Criminal Intelligence Fusion Centre.47 
Governance arrangements  
3.40 The NOCRP establishes a Senior Officers' Group on Organised Crime (SOG 
on OC) to undertake work on legislative interoperability and information sharing 
measures. Responsibilities of the SOG on OC include identifying opportunities to 
enhance information and intelligence sharing across and between Australian 
governments and internationally, including with regulatory agencies, the private sector 
and communities.
48
  
                                              
45  Australian Government, National Organised Crime Response Plan: Overview 2010–13, 
Commonwealth of Australia, p. 3.  
46  Australian Government, National Organised Crime Response Plan: Overview 2010–13, 
Commonwealth of Australia, p. 4.  
47  Australian Government, National Organised Crime Response Plan: Overview 2010–13, 
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24  
 
3.41 The SOG on OC reports to SCAG and the Australian police ministers on 
organised crime through the Ministerial Council for Police and Emergency 
Management—Police (MCPEMP) on implementation of the National Response Plan.  
Figure 1: Reporting and governance structure: SOG on OC and the National 
Response Plan 
 
Source: Australian Government, National Organised Crime Response Plan: Overview 2010 –2013, 
Commonwealth of Australia, p. 8. 
3.42 As the overarching OCSF recognised organised crime as a national security 
issue, it provided a lead role for the ACC in the national criminal intelligence effort 
against organised crime. At the same time, the 2008 National Security Statement and 
2009 OCSF gave the ACC 'a seat at the table with other traditional players in the 
national security intelligence space'.
49
  The ACC became a member of senior decision 
making forums including the National Security Policy Coordination Group (NSPCG) 
and National Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICC).
50
 The ACC currently 
leads the Criminal Intelligence Working Group which is developing a national 
Criminal Intelligence Strategy. According to the AGD, the strategy will: 
…harness the collective intelligence capabilities available to law 
enforcement agencies to better target serious and organised crime. The 
                                              
49  Mr Patrick Walsh, Submission 2, p. 3.  
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Strategy will support the development of a richer intelligence picture by 
ensuring our law enforcement, intelligence, national security, policy and 
regulatory agencies are collaborating and sharing intelligence more 
effectively.
51
  
3.43 The National Criminal Intelligence Strategy includes the ACIM which is 
currently under development as a response to OCSF capability 1. The model details 
the intelligence cycle to guide the development of strategy initiatives, plans and 
capabilities. According to the AGD, the strategy will enable an alignment of concepts 
under the intelligence cycle, promote interoperability of intelligence resources across 
jurisdictions and advance the capacity to share intelligence outputs.
52
 In 2010–11, 
ACC and partner agencies began planning the model. 
ACC within national security governance  
3.44 In his submission, Mr Patrick Walsh, a Senior Lecturer at the Australian 
Graduate School of Policing and Security at Charles Sturt University, noted that the 
changes brought about by the inclusion of the ACC within national security 
governance raised questions regarding the role and objectives that the ACC should 
have within the national security framework.
53
 He noted in this regard that: 
It is clear that since 2008 that the ACC has become increasingly involved in 
issues that are high priorities for the broader Australian national security 
community. It has revealed publicly in its annual reporting to government 
that it has played a support role in the collection and analysis of criminal 
intelligence on the extent of financing of terrorism and people smuggling 
through criminal activity. Additionally, in its last Annual Report it indicated 
that it was going to establish a border determination called: national 
security impacts from serious and organised crime rather than the previous 
narrower intelligence operations on specific issues such as terrorism or 
people smuggling.
54
 
3.45 According to Mr Walsh, while there is scope for this broader approach which 
will enable examination of the links between organised crime and other national 
security issues beyond people smuggling or terrorism, the most significant role the 
ACC can play in the national security space is to 'use its fusion centre to link any 
proceeds of crime to entities that are also of national security concern'. However, in 
Mr Walsh's view, such an initiative would require greater sharing and collaboration 
between the ACC and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and 
more broadly, better governance on the part of the ACC and national security 
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community around intelligence and operational activities.
55
 Such concerns also go to 
the question of whether the ACC's criminal intelligence methodology, or 'Sentinel 
Strategy', will require modification to operate effectively within the national security 
space.
56
 They also go to the question of how the ACIM will address the current siloing 
and fragmentation of intelligence into domains including that of national security. 
Capacity to share information  
3.46 Many submitters raised concerns about the ability of current systems and 
processes to effectively manage the extension of the range of law enforcement and 
other government agencies, as well as prescribed private sector bodies with which 
intelligence can be shared. Questions and concerns regarding capacity to share 
information and intelligence go to matters of governance, coordination, legislative 
limitations and interoperability. They relate to: 
 ACC governance arrangements and establishment of boundaries between the 
ACC, AFP and ASIO to avoid duplication and enable clear distinctions in 
responsibilities when organised crime targets become national security matters. 
The issue of duplication and overlap is also relevant to the intelligence 
functions of the ACC in relation to CrimTrac and AUSTRAC;
57
 
 harmonisation of intelligence requirements across the national security 
intelligence priorities and national criminal intelligence priorities coordinated 
in the ACC; 
 safeguards and protections which apply to the sharing of information with a 
wider range of agencies and entities;
 58
 
 the extent to which the national framework, and particularly its NOCRP, is the 
most effective model for gathering criminal intelligence and information from 
the states and territories, given that they have general responsibility for 
criminal law in Australia;
59
 and   
 the role of the ACC Board and extent to which board agencies are consistently 
collecting intelligence against the priorities set by it.
60
  
3.47 Underpinning these matters and concerns is the question of how to provide for 
greater interoperability and information sharing in relation to criminal intelligence. 
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Establishing an interoperable criminal intelligence system sets technological, 
legislative, methodological, resource and cultural challenges across the criminal 
intelligence community. These are matters considered in detail in the following 
chapters of this report.  
  
 
  
 
CHAPTER 4 
Legislative, technological, methodological, resource and 
cultural challenges  
4.1 Commonwealth, state and territory criminal intelligence stakeholders who 
gave evidence to this inquiry recognised the need for criminal intelligence to fight 
serious and organised crime and to support mechanisms to improve timely intelligence 
sharing.  Recent amendments to the ACC Act widened the range of entities that the 
ACC can share intelligence with. However, evidence to the committee supported the 
view that the intention behind these new arrangements, which is to provide for a more 
comprehensive response to organised crime, cannot be fully realised until existing 
limitations, challenges, perceptions and hurdles within the current criminal 
intelligence framework are addressed. This chapter considers those challenges.  
4.2 Many submitters argued that the various arrangements in place for gathering, 
storing and sharing criminal intelligence are out-dated, impractical and not fit for 
purpose. Legislative, structural and resource impediments to the flow of intelligence 
were highlighted as well as a range of unintended consequences including unequal 
intelligence holdings, an incomplete picture of criminal threats and declining 
stakeholder confidence. Some stakeholders held reservations about sharing their own 
information and did not recognise the value added to that information when converted 
into intelligence and returned to them. Mr Mark Burgess, CEO of the Police 
Federation of Australia (PFA), stated that intelligence was, for many years, considered 
a 'big black hole where information went in but no-one received anything out of'.
1
 
Such concerns are exacerbated by the absence of a common approach to collecting, 
collating, analysing and disseminating criminal intelligence. Efforts to establish an 
interoperable criminal intelligence system capable of producing a comprehensive 
national picture of organised crime are hindered for these reasons. This chapter 
considers the current challenges towards a national criminal intelligence system.  
4.3 One of the primary aims of the National Organised Crime Response Plan 
(NOCRP) is to remove capability gaps in and impediments to inter-jurisdictional 
collaboration and sharing of information and intelligence.
2
 However, the ACC 
submitted that producing a national picture of serious and organised crime was 
complicated by various factors relating to the collection, use and sharing of criminal 
intelligence including:  
 limited availability and accessibility of current and complete criminal 
intelligence and other information used in the production of criminal 
intelligence; and 
 the absence of agreement on a consistent way in which Australian agencies 
collect, collate, analyse, produce, store and disseminate criminal intelligence, 
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which has led to inconsistent intelligence collection plans and priorities as 
well as duplication of effort by such agencies.
3
 
4.4 The ACC asserted that these challenges cause 'much duplication of effort and 
inefficiency' amongst the law enforcement agencies, policing, national security and 
other government and private sector bodies in 'understanding the most effective 
response to the threat and impact of serious and organised crime'.
4
 Another area of 
potential duplication of effort is in relation to the crossover between volume crime and 
serious and organised crime. This was explained by Commander Alf Fordham of the 
Western Australia Police: 
The problems are that quite often you find that people that operate in one 
zone simultaneously operate in the other zone. What I am talking about 
here is the fact that there are a number of case studies where a national 
target might actually be arrested for domestic violence or for assaulting 
somebody at their local pub on a Friday night, because they actually engage 
in volume crime. But a lot of the people that operate within the serious and 
organised crime sphere have graduated to that sphere from the nursery of 
crime, which is volume crime, and the business model does not necessarily 
accommodate the fact that these people quite easily move from within one 
zone to another zone on a regular basis.
5
 
4.5 Other submitters raised a number of concerns regarding legislative, resource, 
methodological, technological and cultural obstacles and challenges which limited the 
effective flow of information and interoperability. Interoperability concerns systems 
and tools, methodologies, content and data. It is a key capability within the Organised 
Crime Strategic Framework and the ultimate objective for criminal intelligence 
stakeholders. The NOCRP also places emphasis on the importance of interoperability: 
Essential elements of an integrated national approach are enhancing 
interoperability, the sharing of information and intelligence in an effective 
and timely manner and coordinating responses to organised crime across 
jurisdictions.
6
 
4.6 The following section considers the various challenges identified in evidence 
before the committee while drawing on key initiatives and operations to highlight 
concerns. 
Legislative impediments and challenges to sharing intelligence 
4.7 Submitters argued that privacy and security legislation inhibit greater flows of 
timely intelligence and limit the ACC's access to information and intelligence. 
Security and privacy legislation dictate who intelligence can be shared with and for 
                                              
3  Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, pp 3 & 14.  
4  Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 3. 
5  Commander Alf Fordham, Western Australia Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, 
p. 42.  
6  Australian Government, National Organised Crime Response Plan: Overview 2010–13, 
Commonwealth of Australia, p. 9. 
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what purpose.
7
 Telecommunications intercept material collected by the ACC, for 
example, may only be shared with a small number of agencies with many of the 
ACC's partners excluded from current sharing provisions.
8
 
4.8 The Northern Territory (NT) Police identified challenges including 
complexity of the 'various ACC legislation which restricts some of the dissemination 
rules' and the limited technological capability of the ACID and ALEIN database.
9
 
Queensland Police's Acting Assistant Commissioner Gayle Hogan also noted that 
legislation impacts 'what information can be shared, how it can be shared and how it 
can then be disseminated'.
10
  
4.9 The ACC's CEO, John Lawler recognised that: 
…whilst there has been some very good work done by the department over 
a number of years in looking at these legislative impediments and working 
to eliminate them where it was possible to do so, the reality is that some 
still remain, and it does inhibit the sharing of information.
11
 
4.10 Intelligence sharing currently takes place through a range of Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOUs), sharing agreements or requests for information between 
agencies. As these are primarily individual arrangements, they can create silos of 
information. The PFA commented that such arrangements create an 'ad hoc system of 
information sharing that lacks consistency' and can hamper the speed of intelligence 
sharing.
12
 CrimTrac also noted that while different rules will always apply in different 
jurisdictions, law enforcement and intelligence agencies have also taken different 
approaches in relation to data collection.
13
  
Multi-agency task forces 
4.11 Multi-agency task forces serve as an example of interoperability of law 
enforcement agencies and operate under MOUs. They are increasingly utilised as a 
means of combining resources and providing for the flow of intelligence between 
taskforce members. The AFP listed a number of taskforces currently in operation 
including the Polaris Taskforce, Criminal Assets Confiscation Taskforce, Joint 
Organised Crime Taskforce (Victoria), Joint Organised Crime Group (Sydney office), 
Taskforce Galilee, Yelverton Taskforce (Perth), and the new waterfront taskforces.
14
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13  Mr Doug Smith, CrimTrac, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 27.  
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4.12 The ACC Board has the power to establish multi-agency task forces in 
response to concerns about a particular serious and organised crime matter. Evidence 
to the committee suggested that prescribed task forces have become the primary 
means of circumventing legislative and other impediments to the sharing of 
information and intelligence. Mr Greg Williams, Deputy Commissioner of the ATO 
explained that during the course of an operation, when a matter arises, agencies might 
not be able to respond because appropriate mechanisms are not in place. Whereas: 
The creation of the prescribed task force model has been an attempt to 
circumvent that or actually provide the opportunity for interoperability 
around the sharing of information. But sitting behind that [task force model] 
are still the business-as-usual requirements…Where it is prescribed, those 
problems then go away.
15
 
4.13 Drawing on the example of Project Wickenby, Mr Williams explained how 
information can be shared more freely between task force agencies under the 
prescribed arrangements:  
In the context of Project Wickenby, the information-sharing exception has 
underpinned the broader outcomes achieved by the Wickenby agencies. 
However, the same broad ability does not currently exist for other 
exceptions to secrecy laws in relation to the risk area of serious and 
organised crime. Under the serious offences exception, information cannot 
be shared as freely between law enforcement agencies as occurs with the 
task force disclosure provisions.
16
 
4.14 The prescribed task force provision has, according to Mr Williams and others, 
been a significant initiative in cross-agency cooperation. The ATO alone is involved 
in 29 separate task forces relating to serious and organised crime. According to Mr 
Williams, that number is expected to grow.
17
 Assistant Commissioner Morris of the 
AFP identified joint task forces as the 'order of the day in terms of delivering the 
business'.
18
 He emphasised the importance of joint task forces and the AFP's 
contribution to them:  
Some of the joint task forces we see working today—whether they are on 
the waterfront or the joint organised crime task force in Victoria or the 
standing joint task force with the New South Wales police and ACC—
involve very significant intelligence inputs. Those inputs come from a wide 
variety of sources. 
They will be from our own intelligence holdings and investigations right 
through to our international interface with either law enforcement agencies 
in the region or more traditional…partners like New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom, the United States and Canada. 
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The AFP draws in that information internationally as well as our own 
holdings. We use our covert services to proactively fill information gaps 
that will assist task forces and combine that with the intelligence from our 
partner agencies, whether they be at the federal level such as Customs and 
the ACC or at the state level with the various law enforcement 
organisations.
19
 
4.15 The AFP's Assistant Commissioner Morris explained that task forces must 
start with a solid intelligence foundation before commencing operations and 
highlighted the fundamental importance of intelligence to a task force:  
It is commonly known that when you are creating a task force to address a 
crime issue the analysts are usually the first people you pick in order to get 
the continuity of the intelligence picture before you started and also to take 
the continuity of the new information right through the whole task force 
information. What we have found is that when those task forces begin they 
generate their own intelligence that perpetuates new investigations and new 
outcomes. We are also able to deliver that into proposals for legislative 
reform, policy reform and so on. It is not just about a law enforcement 
outcome; it is about trying, in the case of organised crime, to target-harden 
the environment to prevent future offences.
20
 
4.16 Agencies have also used task forces in innovative ways to better meet their 
needs. The ATO's Mr Williams informed the committee that his agency had 
developed a secure information exchange system to support the transfer of electronic 
data between agencies involved in Project Wickenby. He noted that the system will 
allow agencies to transfer and share information in a timely and secure manner and 
ultimately to collaborate on documents.
21
 
4.17 While also recognising the importance of task forces, Mr Mark Geddes, 
Agency Intelligence Coordinator of ASIC drew attention to a lack of continuity from 
one task force to the next. Reflecting on ASIC's involvement in task forces Galilee 
and Attero, Mr Geddes explained that: 
There is no doubt that these special-purpose groups—the task forces that 
are set up—achieve a common language and an ability to rapidly share 
information. But that is not necessarily transferable to new task forces, 
depending on the membership. So there is a gap in that capability: once we 
get together for a specific purpose, can we transfer that to the next reason 
that we get together? Often it is a reinvention of the wheel each time that 
happens.
22
  
4.18 Mr Burgess of the PFA noted that while joint task forces had conducted 
successful operations such as Operation Wickenby, 'even these effective 
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collaborations are hampered by burdensome sharing procedures'.
23
 The ATO also 
noted that even in the context of a task force, it may not be at liberty to disclose 
information to participating law enforcement partners. It supported greater freedom of 
exchange in relation to information within the task force context in order that it can be 
used to pursue criminal conduct.
24
  
Limitations on intelligence gathering and sharing 
4.19 Where specific intelligence sharing arrangements such as task forces are not 
in place, agencies raised concerns that they are unable to fully access ACC 
intelligence holdings. Witnesses also pointed to other legislative challenges and 
impacts. For example, the ATO explained that there was an inconsistency in its ability 
to obtain information from Commonwealth agencies relating to the application or 
administration of the indirect tax law. This may limit the ATO's 'ability to use 
information disseminated from the ACC for a civil function even where it is essential 
in addressing the indirect tax crime risk'. The ATO identified four areas for legislative 
reform to improve its own access to ACC's criminal intelligence and in turn, its own 
capacity to address the tax crime risk.
25
 These include: 
 enabling the ATO to use its compulsory information gathering powers in 
relation to indirect tax to obtain information from Commonwealth agencies 
such as the ACC; 
 amending the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 to 
allow the ATO to use information gained through telecommunications 
interception in the course of joint investigations by taskforces;
26
 
 enabling the ATO to make derivative use of information that the ACC has 
obtained under the Surveillance Devises Act 2002 where the ACC determines 
it appropriate to do so; and  
 enabling the ATO to access real time content pursuant to the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979.
27
 
4.20 Restrictions on information such as telephone interception material was raised 
as a specific concern by the ATO and ASIC as explained by Mr Geddes: 
We can access telecommunications metadata et cetera, or stored 
communications, but we cannot actually intercept telecommunications or 
use the interception material that has been gained. We have to be careful 
                                              
23  Mr Mark Burgess, PFA, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 1.  
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25  Australian Taxation Office, Submission 15, p. 4.  
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when we are engaging with the organised crime environment, a lot of which 
uses telephone intercept material, that we do not allow that to be used in our 
operational environment.
28
 
4.21 Detective Chief Inspector Colin Cunningham of the South Australia Police 
identified interaction of Commonwealth legislation with state legislation as the key 
issue that needs to be addressed in order to establish a national criminal intelligence 
model. He provided the following example about telecommunications companies 
(telcos) to highlight the point: 
Telcos and most of the law enforcement agencies around the country do 
many telephone checks. We know that our serious crime cartels or groups 
use mobile telephones quite frequently. In fact, it is not unusual for 
criminals to use one phone per day and then discard it. So, as law 
enforcement agencies, we do a lot of telephone subscriber checks. We get 
statements from the telcos. In South Australia, for example, we may be 
doing the same intelligence checks as the ACC is doing, but, because of 
certain dissemination requirements through the legislation, we would not 
know. So we could be doubling up on that. 
… In these days of budget restraints and so forth, if we are going to have a 
true global exchange of intelligence then there needs to be some 
examination of the cost of telco checks and how we exchange that 
information. Law enforcement as a whole could well be spending millions 
on this. If we could examine at your level or at a higher level how the 
Commonwealth legislation interacts with the state legislation in terms of 
that exchange of information, that would be very valuable to us.
29
 
4.22 The ATO expressed frustration with the secrecy provisions which limited 
their ability to share information. Mr Williams noted that the ATO could only provide 
generic information when it might be holding valuable detailed information which law 
enforcement agencies are unable to access. This, in turn, creates difficulties in the 
relationship with criminal intelligence stakeholders as: 
…people are desperately trying to deal with something, they know that 
there is information that would be of value to them to do it, but we are 
required by our secrecy provisions not to provide that at the present point in 
time.
30
 
4.23 As a whole, the current system creates 'unequal data holdings, which risks 
some agencies being unaware of certain intelligence, misinformation about certain 
situations, or duplication of intelligence gathering operations'.
31
 The PFA argued that 
the recent establishment of a Firearms Intelligence and Targeting Team and in-
principle agreement to establish a national firearms identification database had the 
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potential to provide an extensive national intelligence picture on firearms. In contrast, 
the current arrangements under an MOU between the AFP and ACBPS are such that 
the ACBPS is required to notify the AFP of all dangerous weapon detections 'as soon 
as practicable'.
32
 Drawing from this experience, the PFA noted that a uniform 
information scheme would provide for greater accountability given that:  
With the current method of information requests or MOUs between the 
myriad of individual agencies, it is very difficult to keep track of what is 
being shared, between whom, and under what circumstances.
33
  
4.24 Another matter of concern raised by witnesses was that of managing Freedom 
of Information (FOI) legislation. Acting Deputy Commissioner Pope of the Victoria 
Police identified FOI legislation around the country as one of the legislative 
challenges to a national criminal intelligence mechanism. He noted that: 
We may get an FOI request in Victoria for our intelligence, for instance, 
and we may well refuse that request. But if it is sitting in a national system, 
then that same FOI request may well be made to another agency that has 
access to the data or who hosts the system. So the idea is trying to get some 
consistency around that, and I understand that CrimTrac and the 
government are currently working their way through some draft legislation, 
and these sorts of issues are coming to the surface.
34
 
4.25 However, the AGD warned that legal impediments are 'often raised but when 
you explore them they are not necessarily impediments' and that sometimes, the 
impediments are in fact, cultural. Furthermore, Mr Anderson of the AGD also noted 
that there are always going to be tensions between the need to disclose which itself 
carries risks and the need to withhold intelligence.
35
  
Balancing a need to share with a need to protect  
4.26 The PFA argued that the free flow of intelligence would assist police officers 
in the performance of their daily duties and that they should be provided 'with direct 
real time access to intelligence holdings on operational grounds' for this reason. The 
PFA commented that police officers, and those they interact with, are 'most at risk 
when an officer is forced to operate in a situation without proper intelligence 
regarding the circumstances of the situation'. He explained that:  
Examples of such situations include; interacting with a person whose 
criminal history or mental illnesses are unknown to the officer, pulling over 
a car without knowing that it may have been involved in the commission of 
a criminal offence, or entering premises unaware of the possible presence of 
drug-manufacturing chemicals. These dangerous situations that police 
officers could face have endless permutations. The free flow of information 
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between agencies ensures that police officers have ease of access to real 
time intelligence, and can access any known intelligence on any situation.
36
 
4.27 In contrast to current arrangements, the PFA further argued that a uniform 
sharing process would provide a 'platform for regulating how information is used, and 
also to monitor and prevent the misuse of information'. Privacy and integrity concerns 
emanating from police accessing real time intelligence holdings for operational 
purposes could, according to the PFA, be addressed by way of 'electronic data 
tracking' capabilities which could be provided under a uniform electronic system.
37
  
4.28 The Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI) 
acknowledged that the ACC, the AFP and to a lesser extent, the ACBPS, had 
established 'electronic auditing of staff access to information databases' which is a key 
feature in ensuring the integrity and security of sensitive information.
38
 ACLEI stated 
that integrity testing pursuant to legislation introduced in March 2012 was an 
'effective deterrence measure concerning unauthorised access and disclosure of 
official information'. ACLEI commented that this will serve as a significant 
enhancement to the integrity regime that protects sensitive information.
39
 
Nevertheless, ACLEI also raised concerns in relation to the 'need to share' intelligence 
by highlighting the importance of appropriate arrangements to protect intelligence 
from unauthorised disclosure. In this regard, ACLEI noted that allegations relating to 
breaches of operational security through inappropriate disclosure of information were 
amongst the corruption issues 'most frequently' raised with the Integrity 
Commissioner.
40
  
Technological challenges  
4.29 As previously noted, criminal intelligence is currently stored in more than 
30 systems operated by Australian law enforcement, policing, national security and 
other government agencies, with limited interoperability across them.
41
 With the 
widening of the range of agencies and stakeholders involved in gathering, using, 
providing and analysing criminal intelligence, there are greater technological 
challenges to achieving an interoperable system.  
4.30 CrimTrac seeks to enhance policing and law enforcement through the 
provision of high quality information services to law enforcement agencies. It operates 
three systems—National Automated Fingerprint Identification System, National 
Criminal Investigation DNA Database and National Police Reference System.
42
 
AUSTRAC, Australia's anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing 
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regulator and specialist financial intelligence unit, draws on the intelligence holdings 
of the ACC, AFP and the ACBPS to add value to AUSTRAC intelligence.
43
  
4.31 While there are numerous agencies involved in criminal intelligence, there is 
no single and complete 'point-of-truth' for Australian criminal intelligence holdings 
nor an automated process for searching across all such systems simultaneously.
44
 The 
ACBPS noted that its analysts often do not have access, or have only limited access, 
to other law enforcement databases 'unless they are either part of a joint taskforce or 
out posted with the partner agency'. Consequently:  
Siloed access to agency databases has resulted in duplication of analytical 
effort and operational activity. A consolidated IT domain, where 
intelligence can be shared and accessed across agencies would be a 
significant step in improving the interoperability of Australian law 
enforcement agencies in relation to criminal intelligence holdings.
45
  
4.32 Mr Lawler, CEO of ACC, emphasised the need for real time intelligence and 
that to fight organised crime, intelligence needs to be available within 48 hours of it 
occurring.
46
 However, according to the PFA, many police forces still rely on central 
and even manual processes for intelligence sharing. They argue this not only slows 
down the intelligence flow to operational frontline police but is 'ineffective, time 
consuming, and potentially dangerous for operational police and those they interact 
with'.
47
 
4.33 CrimTrac draws a parallel between greater interoperability and improving 
information for criminal intelligence purposes:  
The information provisioned to CrimTrac to deliver the 'reference data' is 
sourced from the separate and independent systems of policing of the eight 
federal, state and territory police agencies…There are impediments in 
gathering consistent data from disparate systems from a range of sources, 
and whilst the information is made available to agencies such as the ACC 
and AFP, the value of this interoperability may be enhanced if we could 
achieve efficiencies in 'making the connections'.
48
 
4.34 Mr Geddes from ASIC argued that while the ability to share information 
rapidly was a commonly held aspiration, it was tempered by two factors, namely 
logistics and legislative impediments. In relation to logistical challenges, he 
commented that each agency that is a board member of the ACC has its 'own 
information and communications technology, and they are always operating on 
different cycles'. As a consequence, each state jurisdiction and Commonwealth agency 
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is at a different phase in terms of developing their information and communications 
technology. This makes it 'unlikely that two—let alone dozens—of those agencies will 
have full compatible and interoperable systems'. Therefore, any new platform that 
might be considered that allows for real-time communication of information 'has to 
potentially be built from scratch, and there is likely a cost there'.
49
 Mr Geddes 
concluded: 
So I guess no individual agency has the current resourcing or the current 
budget to build a separate, stand-alone system, and I think that has to be 
factored into the considerations.
50
 
4.35 Another challenge in relation to interoperability is the variability and 
differences in the technological capabilities across agencies. Some agencies have 
undergone a process of modernisation. AUSTRAC is midway through modernising 
and enhancing its analytical systems and recently updated its IT infrastructure.
51
 For 
others, such as the Victoria Police, overhaul of its intelligence processes, standards, 
practices and competencies are planned.
52
  
4.36 NT Police information and communications technology are at their life's end. 
Assistant Commissioner Kershaw recognised that their systems are 'not fast enough' at 
being able to capture real time information and feed it into systems such as the Fusion 
Taskforce. He explained that: 
We are constantly looking at ways of how we can get the right information 
reports, for example, into those central repositories and then extract what 
we need out of them. So a lot of it has come down to the different systems, 
and we are looking at some different systems up here at the moment 
because we are finding that we are at the end of the life of our systems. In 
particular, when you have a large number of police on the street who are 
collecting intelligence for you every day, it is very critical that you have a 
central repository in-house. It is important from a serious-and-organised-
crime point of view, and I think it is important from a national point of view 
as well.
53
 
4.37 The PFA highlighted the 'burdensome process of sharing and accessing 
intelligence' which has 'frustrated police for a long time'. As a case in point, the 
Queensland Police Service has been calling for a centralised database of at-risk 
children given that without such a database, 'police are flying blind'.
54
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ACID and ALEIN 
4.38 Section 7 of the ACC Act provides the ACC with the legal authority to 
collect, correlate, analyse and disseminate criminal information and intelligence and to 
maintain a national database of that information and intelligence.
55
 ALEIN is a secure 
extranet which provides a gateway to the ACID and two other databases managed by 
the ACC.
56
 ACID provides a 'secure, centralised, national repository for criminal 
intelligence'.
57
 It serves as the 'major system for sharing intelligence between 
Commonwealth, state and territory law enforcement agencies'.
58
 ACID enables ACC 
staff to share highly protected information with client law enforcement agencies 
through the ALEIN network. It is accessible to more than 25 Commonwealth, state 
and territory law enforcement agencies and regulatory authorities. However, evidence 
to the committee upheld the view that ACID and ALEIN were no longer capable of 
meeting the needs of its users. Assistant Commissioner Kershaw of the NT Police said 
that ACID and ALEIN were 'probably at their use-by date' and that a new system was 
required.
59
 
4.39 The ACC acknowledged that ACID and ALEIN are 'based on outdated 
technology and [are] no longer fit for purpose'.
60
 CEO, Mr Lawler, recognised that 
frustration with the system as expressed by some state and territory jurisdictions 
emanated from the fact that it is 'not able to deliver the sort of performance that one 
expects now in a personal context from the sort of computer power that is more 
broadly available'. Mr Lawler continued:  
It is quite clunky, and the sorts of tools that are available are not where they 
need to be. That has had the effect of a drop in user numbers, which I would 
expect to continue until such time as that is remediated.
61
  
4.40 Similarly, the PFA stated that while there had been successes in relation to 
multi-agency operations such as Project Wickenby and Project Hoffman,
62
 the 
technology that underpins much of the intelligence sharing capabilities is out-dated as:  
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…the ACC intelligence sharing systems, ACID and ALEIN, are based on 
technology from the 1980s. Meanwhile, criminals utilise advanced 
technology developed in 2012, and are continually updating. The 
technological capabilities that facilitate the sharing, collating and analysis 
of criminal intelligence needs to be updated to modern technology 
standards, and the necessary resources should be made available to do so.
63
  
4.41 Mr Patrick Walsh described ACID as a 'poor' intelligence database and 
explained the ramifications for constructing a national picture of serious and organised 
crime:  
…this is not a user-friendly system and while the ACC regularly posts its 
intelligence products on it ACID is not used extensively by all law 
enforcement agencies. This reduces national knowledge about certain 
criminal threats and degrades law enforcement's ability to do effective 
strategic intelligence which can provide warning to government about the 
potential development of future organised crime threats.
64
  
4.42 Similarly, Detective Superintendent Pointing of the Queensland Police 
Service observed that closed-circuit television (CCTV) data, telephone intercept data 
and social media data were 'too complex for ACID'.
65
 However, the PFA highlighted 
the fact that ACID and the development of the National Firearms Identification 
Database had provided opportunities to 'build truly national intelligence holdings and 
to serve as models for more complete intelligence sharing capabilities'. One of the 
lessons emanating from these experiences according to Mr Burgess of the PFA is that 
these repositories do not solve the problem of siloed intelligence holdings: 
The multitude of variables and factors faced by front-line police and the 
highly complex nature of organised crime mean that all intelligence is 
potentially valuable and potentially linked to other intelligence. Therefore, 
separate holdings on issues such as firearms and drug intelligence is not 
providing a complete picture.
66
 
4.43 The Queensland Police Service also made the point that there were new 
approaches that may be a better solution than ACID given the rapidly growing 
technology and advances made since the 1980s. Acting Assistant Commissioner 
Hogan noted that the limitations of ACID had led many agencies to develop other 
ways to share information which has driven up the number of direct requests to 
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specific jurisdictions. The Queensland Police Service alone receives an average of 
16 000 requests for information a year which places considerable strain on its 
resources.
67
 
4.44 The ATO also noted that availability and access to criminal intelligence could 
be enhanced via technology solutions. The ATO explained that the Criminal 
Intelligence Working Group which contributes to the National Information and 
Intelligence Needs Analysis coordinated by the ACC, is working on enhanced 
technology.
68
 Addressing these technological challenges are key considerations before 
the agencies engaged in the development of the ACIM which is discussed in 
Chapter 5.  
4.45 The ACC explained that the ACID is a tool predominantly used for the second 
phase of collecting and collating as well as the third phase of analysis and production 
of intelligence. The ACID will not be incorporated into the ACIM because the former 
serves as a searchable database containing criminal intelligence data while the ACIM 
is a set of strategies, processes and guidelines for managing criminal intelligence 
nationally. A Proceeds of Crime funded scoping study was initiated in 2010 to 
examine further options for the provision of ACID and ALEIN, however, neither is 
currently under redevelopment.
69
 
Methodological challenges  
4.46 Rather than the implementation of a single, consistent methodology in relation 
to criminal intelligence across jurisdictions, different agencies are applying different 
approaches and methods. Assistant Commissioner Kershaw of the NT Police observed 
that the various jurisdictions 'are not on the same page as far as what sort of model we 
are using in relation to criminal intelligence'.
70
 
4.47 While the value of criminal intelligence is without question, agencies are at 
different stages of developing and strengthening their criminal intelligence 
capabilities:  
 Victoria Police overhauled is state intelligence division and reformed its 
intelligence processes in July 2012 to produce a Victoria Police Intelligence 
Doctrine after applying the UK National Criminal Intelligence Model for 
some years;
71
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 Queensland Police Service is currently undertaking a review of its structure 
including its intelligence to 'make sure we are looking at all of the best 
practice there is';
72
 
 South Australia Police have undertaken a major structural change in relation 
to intelligence-policing since 2000;
73
 and   
 Northern Territory Police is currently restructuring its intelligence division 
and examining different domestic and international models and approaches in 
relation to its intelligence doctrine.
74
  
4.48 Of concern to the committee is the extent to which these new models and 
approaches will be consistent with the proposed ACIM as it develops. Having 
invested resources, time and energy into establishing these new models, the question 
remains as to what extent jurisdictions will be willing to adapt their systems to ensure 
interoperability and complementarity with the ACIM. This problem was recognised 
by Mr Patrick Walsh who observed that policing agencies across the country have 
their own intelligence frameworks and doctrines. He explained that as long as every 
agency has its own doctrine, connectivity between them at the national level would 
remain a challenge. He recognised that solutions to this challenge include the 
establishment of common values around training: 
If an analyst is trained and they work in Victoria Police, that person should 
be able to go to the Federal Police and the Federal Police should be 
thinking, 'I do not need to retrain this person because I know their common 
standards of training'. There certainly needs to be career progression for 
analysts so that they do not just get stuck in these support roles. That is a 
funding issue. There needs to be better governance across our law 
enforcement intelligence community. I think the ACC has done some things 
in that area, some good things in the training space, and also in trying to 
develop greater coordination and sharing at the ACC board level.
75
 
4.49 Differences in approach are further demonstrated by the extent to which 
jurisdictions share available information with the ACC. Some share all information 
while others are more discerning. Tasmania Police, contributed over 50 000 items of 
information and intelligence to ACID over eight months in 2012. It had taken a 
decision years ago to 'push absolutely everything up' to the ACC.
76
 Similarly, the WA 
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Police committed to giving almost all of its data to the ACC.
77
 However, Commander 
Fordham noted that despite this approach, and extended offers to the ACC to place 
analysts on the floor within WA Police intelligence, concerns remained that 
intelligence given to the police was not provided in a timely manner. He also noted 
that the ACC may be accused of 'borrowing our watch to tell us the time' as its own 
intelligence was often returned to it without any added analysis.
78
 Similarly, the NT 
Police submitted that jurisdictions were often provided information that they already 
had.
79
 
4.50 The ACC underscored the importance of a consistent approach to the 
management of intelligence assets. Noting the challenges of a limited understanding 
of the value and utility of criminal intelligence, the ACC argued for a nationally 
consistent approach to managing such assets through the establishment of common 
standards, protocols and processes.
80
  
Standardisation of intelligence information  
4.51 According to the ACC, in 2010–11, there were 2775 active users of ACID 
with nearly 560 000 searches for information and intelligence while a total of 451 039 
information and intelligence documents were uploaded onto the system.
81
 The 
following year, the number of searchers fell to 331 664 reflecting a continued decline 
across all agencies for three years in a row.
82
 
4.52 While it is widely accepted that ACID/ALEIN cannot meet the standards of 
sharing capabilities, law enforcement and other agencies are 'bombarding each other 
with requests for information'.
83
 Yet, the ACC highlighted that the quality, quantity 
and format of intelligence uploaded onto these systems are 'significantly varied'.
84
 The 
ACBPS alone uploads approximately 19 000 intelligence reports to ACID every year 
and made the point that agencies contributing to the criminal intelligence holdings 
'apply different business rules to the process, which can result in marked differences 
in information quality, timeliness and consistency'.
85
  
4.53 Furthermore, there is no consistent request for information (RFI) process. This 
amplifies the challenges in relation to intelligence sharing and analysis. While 
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acknowledging the requirement to balance a 'need to know' with a 'responsibility to 
share', the ACC held that a single and complete point-of-truth for Australian criminal 
intelligence and a consistent approach to RFIs would resolve these challenges.
86
 
4.54 CrimTrac pointed out that without applying due diligence when entering the 
information and having robust checks for user data entry errors (including the 
resolution of subject identity issues), the value of the information can be limited. In 
this regard, CrimTrac argued for a system that would provide for accurate data:  
Accurate information has flow on benefits to the user as they do not have to 
check and potentially amend the material down the track. The greater the 
accuracy and validity of the identifying and reference information, the 
higher user confidence will be that the information can be trusted and 
effectively used for multiple purposes.
87
  
4.55 The PFA also held that a uniform standard of information sharing would 
ensure that 'all law enforcement and other relevant agencies contribute to the same 
extent, and have the same intelligence, solving these inefficiency risks'.
88
 The PFA 
argued that either all such agencies move towards a single database or establish a link 
between their respective intelligence holdings in order that any intelligence held by 
one agency is accessible by another. However:  
Whatever form it takes, only this free flow of criminal intelligence will 
provide law enforcement agencies with the complete intelligence picture. 
Without it, Australia's police and other agencies are forced to combat crime 
with one eye closed.
89
  
4.56 The PFA maintained that there was scope to extend the standardised national 
approach for recording drugs intelligence collected at seizures. Currently, the ACID 
and ALEIN include a centralised clandestine laboratory information repository. A 
mandatory requirement to provide drugs intelligence combined with widening the 
variety of data types could assist law enforcement agencies to track the movement and 
distribution of illicit drugs, identify crime groups involved in manufacturing and 
distribution, and analyse trends and common methodologies of drug importing, 
manufacturing and distribution. The PFA noted that:  
With the beginnings of a national drug database already present, this 
component of ACID and ALEIN provides an opportunity to implement the 
extensive intelligence sharing processes Australian law enforcement 
needs.
90
 
4.57 The PFA noted in support of the free flow of all criminal intelligence between 
law enforcement and other relevant agencies that in an 'ideal world', all such agencies 
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would be connected to a single criminal intelligence database. While the ACC has a 
legislative mandate to maintain such a database under section 7A of the ACC Act, the 
PFA recognised two obstacles which hinder the establishment of a truly national 
criminal intelligence holding underpinned by the free flow of intelligence:  
…outdated technology which hampers the capability to facilitate 
intelligence sharing, and a lack of mandatory intelligence sharing 
requirements.
91
   
4.58 However, the PFA also recognised other challenges including the need for 
coverage of a large variety of data types in the sharing arrangements. Without this 
being addressed by agencies, particularly the ACC, a comprehensive picture of 
organised crime would not be able to be formed.
92
 To address these obstacles, the PFA 
recommended the development of the 'technical capacity to facilitate the free flow of 
criminal intelligence between law enforcement and relevant agencies, and for 
legislative obligations for agencies to share all their criminal intelligence'.
93
  
National Criminal Target Report  
4.59 The National Criminal Target Report: Serious and Organised Crime Targets 
(NCTR) and accompanying target list is one of the ACC's leading strategic 
intelligence products. While the OCTA provides a picture of the 'what' of organised 
crime, the NCTR provides a picture of the 'who', including entities who represent the 
highest levels of risk to Australia. Covering both Australian and off-shore entities, the 
NCTR is produced through analysis of data provided by law enforcement, state and 
territory police and crime commissions.
94
 Three concerns were raised in relation to the 
target list: 
 that there is not a free flow of information in relation to persons named on the 
list; 
 a lack of analytical information provided on the list; and  
 duplication of data.  
4.60 The PFA argued that there are two reasons that the target list provides an 
opportunity to utilise the potential of linking multiple agencies. First, it noted that the 
flow of criminal intelligence information relating to persons on the list should be a 
consequence of appearing on the list, and, second, this initiative should be a first step 
towards the free flow of all criminal intelligence. Sharing information across agencies 
in relation to such targets could result in a significant disruption of criminal activities 
and attempts on the part of those on the list to avoid law enforcement agencies. Flow-
on consequences of appearing on the list might include 'automatic flagging of the 
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person's passport, the freezing of their financial accounts, and notification and 
tracking of their vehicles' number plates'.
95
 
Lack of analytical information and data duplication  
4.61 The NT Police commented that the NCTR provides a dearth of analytical 
information 'which makes the process of decision-making as an agency problematic, 
in terms of targeting nominal offenders'.
96
 
4.62 The AFP noted in its submission that it is currently redesigning its Target 
Evaluation Priority Index (TEPI) following the introduction of the NCTR to align to 
the input requirements of the NCTR, specifically the Target Risk Assessment 
Methodology, with the aim of reducing data duplication between the agencies.
97
  
4.63 Commander Fordham of the WA Police detailed the risks involved in the 
duplication of criminal intelligence:  
It is also a serious risk because you can have a piece of information that 
gets turned into intelligence in one location. The same piece of information 
gets turned into intelligence at another location which validates the first 
piece of intelligence, because they have not necessarily been linked, and in 
comes a third piece of intelligence which is exactly the same source as on 
all three occasions and suddenly you have proof that something is 
occurring. Because it is not linked and you do not recognise that those 
pieces of information are all coming from the same source, you run the risk 
of validating intelligence using the same information you started with. It is 
essential that we share. I think it is essential that we have a central clearing 
house. How it actually works from a technological perspective is a bit of a 
challenge, but I know WA Police would be very keen to support that 
particular function.
98
 
4.64 As the proposed ACIM will emphasise collecting intelligence once, and using 
it many times, addressing data duplication will take on a heightened importance.  
Cultural challenges 
4.65 Some submitters argued that intelligence had not always been a high priority 
for some agencies. However, following 9/11, greater focus and resources were 
directed to intelligence. Acting Deputy Commissioner Pope explained that in the 
experience of the Victoria Police, intelligence was for a long time the 'poor cousin of 
investigations and other disciplines within the policing context' and that a significant 
cultural shift had to take place to elevate the importance of intelligence.
99
 The NT 
Police took the view that the ACC appears to be 'almost entirely reliant' on Australian 
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law enforcement agencies to provide information used in collection plans (such as the 
Identity Crime Intelligence Collection Plan aimed at identifying current intelligence 
gaps and defining collection strategies) and to generate products such as the National 
Criminal Target Report.
100
 According to the NT Police, this reliance has created a 
situation in which the ACC provides jurisdictions with information that is 'at least on a 
local basis, already known to those agencies'.
101
 Similarly, the Queensland Police 
Service informed the committee that it takes 'exception' if it has provided information 
only to receive a document from the ACC with 'our information almost word for 
word'.
102
 
4.66 Cultural challenges are often underpinned by reluctance on the part of the 
police or underlying traditional police culture whereby tactical and operational 
analysts, detectives and investigators may view strategic intelligence work as lacking 
day-to-day relevance.
103
 Reasons for this include the fact that tactical and operational 
outcomes can easily be measured, resulting in new operations and leading to more 
arrests. In contrast, the identification of emerging trends or preventive strategies does 
not translate directly as success as measured by law enforcement indicators. James 
Cheptycki and Jerry Ratcliffe argue that this reality can create two challenges in 
relation to strategic assessment. First, 'there is a resultant lack of rank-and-file support 
within law enforcement for a process seen as having little relevance'. Secondly, 
complexities in defining measurable outcomes for strategic intelligence products can 
make it difficult to justify the maintenance of a strategic intelligence staff.
104
 In 2003, 
Ratcliffe highlighted the predominance of a performance culture in many police 
services whereby emphasis is placed on measuring everything possible. He warned 
that within such a culture, the 'benefits of intelligence-led policing will be lost in the 
quagmire of operational statistics and micro-management'.
105
 
4.67 While raising concerns with the manner in which intelligence is currently 
shared and the culture underpinning a reluctance to share, all law enforcement 
stakeholders who gave evidence to the committee supported the development of a 
timely, interoperable information sharing mechanism. The AFP, for example, noted 
that: 
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I think culturally we need to work far more with each other about those 
issues, trying to dispel the issues so that you know that your data will not be 
compromised and your operations will not be compromised. That is a little 
bit of a leap of faith. I think you have to do it first and show that there are 
no ill effects to really get the trust.
106
 
4.68 Deputy Commissioner Tilyard of the Tasmania Police noted the reluctance, 
particularly from investigators, to share information and explained the underpinning 
culture: 
They are very committed to their investigations and operations. It is 
confined to a need-to-know situation to the extent that they would not 
dream of mentioning it to their colleagues in the next room that they have 
worked with for 30 years until the operation or investigation is finalised.
107
 
4.69 The AFP acknowledged that any improvements in criminal intelligence such 
as replacing the ACID/ALEIN database should be accompanied by a 'reform of 
processes whereby a dual responsibility exists not only for users to access, but also to 
supply intelligence in furtherance of the national interest'.
108
 The AFP's Assistant 
Commissioner Morris also noted that:  
I think the trust factor is a genuine one. Culturally, too, on occasions 
agencies have championed, including my own—we were self-critical here 
and were a bit too hard on our successes, perhaps at the exclusion of others. 
Others think they are going to miss out on being accredited with the 
attribution to success down the track. I do not underestimate how much that 
retards people from sharing on some occasions. For me, it does not really 
matter who executes the success. We have got to get the intelligence 
together upstream to give our investigators and our frontline police officers 
all the best possible information before they go forward.
109
 
4.70 The PFA argued that the current sharing capabilities fail to offer adequate 
incentives and security to convince law enforcement and other agencies to commit 
their 'hard-earned intelligence to the middle of the law enforcement table'.
110
  During 
its 2007 inquiry, the PJC-ACC also heard evidence that ACID, as the centralised 
national repository for criminal intelligence, was not functioning at its optimum 
potential because contribution by individual law enforcement agencies was 
inconsistent.
111
 During that inquiry, the PJC-ACC was informed about a silo mentality 
to criminal intelligence and the reluctance on the part of some agencies to contribute 
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information because they were concerned about how the information they exchanged 
would be used.
112
  
4.71 The PJC-LE report on the 2010–11 annual reports of the ACC and AFP noted 
that historically, competition and lack of communication between law enforcement 
agencies has, on occasion undermined the necessity for close cooperation to combat 
crime.
113
 The committee, however, recognised that initiatives including the 
establishment of ACC offices in each state and territory, which enabled the ACC to 
keep state police briefed on the ACC's capability and intelligence, had improved the 
flow of information.
114
 
4.72 Assistant Commissioner Kershaw of the NT Police commented that the extent 
to which remnants of a non-sharing culture exists comes down to the individual case 
officer or the individual holder of that intelligence: 
For us it is about educating and about understanding that that is driven by a 
fear of that information being compromised or being acted on when they do 
not want any action taken. It is having the confidence and understanding 
that it is fine to share the information. We have had some demonstrated 
recent sharing of actionable intelligence with Queensland, for example, that 
was outstanding. They were even able to come back and say, 'Some of the 
products that you guys are doing we're going to adopt.' We did the same, so 
it was a positive experience. I think when you do have those positive 
experiences it breaks down all the barriers in relation to sharing 
intelligence.
115
 
4.73 Assistant Commissioner Kershaw emphasised the importance of relationship 
building given that much of the contact between agencies was initiated over the phone 
and that sharing of contacts and networks occurred thereafter.
116
 On the same subject, 
the NSW Police noted that over the last three to four years, the level of cooperation 
between the jurisdictions had been enhanced by initiatives which enabled officers to 
interact more regularly. Identifying forums including the crime forum at assistant 
commissioner level and serious and organised crime coordinating committee, Acting 
Deputy Commissioner Hudson observed that: 
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…everyone has come to the table with an intent basically to mitigate the 
threat of serious and organised crime rather than to protect their 
jurisdictions which was historically what people walked into a room having 
at the back of their mind.
117
 
4.74 However, the process of cultural change takes time. Acting Deputy 
Commissioner Hudson described the process of change within his jurisdiction: 
Change within New South Wales sometimes feels like trying to turn the 
Titanic around, because of the number of police officers, the number of 
databases, the number of users and the education process we need to go 
through to change things.
118
 
Resourcing challenges  
4.75 The ACC raised concerns regarding the level of resources available to it to 
facilitate intelligence sharing. ACC staff must be trained on processes and procedures 
for intelligence sharing before they can engage in this work to ensure compliance with 
the ACC's and its legal dissemination's frameworks. However, the ACC stated that its 
'resource levels are stretched by the volume of intelligence to be collected, analysed 
and shared' which:  
…can adversely affect the timeliness with which intelligence is produced 
and shared. Delays in the production and sharing of intelligence can cause 
frustration amongst stakeholders who require timely advice in support of 
decision-making. This situation is likely to worsen as the need for 
intelligence sharing with the private sector increases. There is currently 
limited flexibility within the ACC's resource base to provide extra staff to 
support the intelligence sharing function without removing officers from 
frontline intelligence and investigative roles.
119
   
4.76 The AFP also raised the matter of ACC resource constraints. The AFP pointed 
to arrangements under the Special Intelligence Operation Authorisation and 
Determination (Child Sex Offences) 2010 whereby 'resource constraints of the ACC' 
resulted in the ACC only providing the coercive hearing capability to glean 
intelligence from identified persons for targeted AFP investigations. The AFP added: 
The ACC is consequentially limited in its ability to value add to the 
analysis and strategic picture development of this crime type due to 
resource commitments. Given more focused resources the ACC may be 
better placed to contribute to better effect and 'value add' to a greater degree 
in development of derived strategic and tactical intelligence.
120
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4.77 The NT Police expressed the view that the ACC appears to be heavily reliant 
on Australian law enforcement agencies to provide personnel for managerial positions 
as well as to establish units within the ACC including the National Organised Crime 
Task Force. In general terms, the NT Police argued that these arrangements impede 
tasks forces 'through no deficiency of involved agencies'.
121
 
Funding challenges—Criminal Intelligence Fusion Capability  
4.78 In May 2010, the Commonwealth announced an investment of $38.5 million 
to combat organised crime and implement the OCSF. Of the total, the ACC was 
provided $14.5 million over five years to establish a Criminal Intelligence Fusion 
Centre (Fusion).
122
 Fusion focuses on identifying risk and threat in relation to 
organised crime. Mrs Karen Harfield, Executive Director, Fusion explained that 
Fusion draws on criminal intelligence and information from other agencies to 
understand what that threat and risk look like: 
In increasing the scope of what is already known—and that might be about 
the who, the what and the how; also the types of methodologies used by 
serious and organised crime networks as well as the vulnerabilities they are 
exploiting—we then specifically understand the requirements for the 
collection part of the intelligence cycle. So we then specifically go out and 
search for information through a variety of methods to fill that intelligence 
gap. The third element is about discovery. So, knowing what you do know, 
and going out and collecting what you do not know, then shows you what 
the new areas for discovery might need to be to pinpoint new and emerging 
risks and threats. So we do this type of work with many partner agencies, 
some of which are actually with us at the ACC working in the Fusion 
capability.
123
 
4.79 The role of Fusion is defined in the ACC's Annual Report 2010–11 as 
follows:  
Fusion enhances monitoring of the highest serious and organised crime 
threats, proactively detects previously unknown but significant serious and 
organised crime threats, enhances links between serious and organised 
crime intelligence and national security, and provides better assessments 
and intelligence to Government and program delivery agencies on the risks 
posed by serious and organised crime for predictive analysis.
124
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4.80 Fusion co-locates investigators, analysts and technical experts to maximise the 
use of public and private sector data and facilitate real-time intelligence sharing and 
analysis. Fusion brings together capabilities from Commonwealth agencies including 
the AFP, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, ASIC, AUSTRAC, ATO, 
Department of Human Services, ACBPS, the national intelligence community and 
state and territory law enforcement authorities. It collects and receives intelligence 
from the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) and other stakeholders including 
Commonwealth law enforcement, regulatory and policy agencies, state/territory police 
agencies and crime commissions, foreign law enforcement agencies supported by the 
AFP and private sector organisations.
125
  
4.81 In the ACC's 2010–11 Annual Report, Mr John Lawler, CEO, stated that:  
Fusion is dramatically increasing capacity to maximise the value of 
intelligence and public and private data holdings. Within months, Fusion 
had generated valuable breakthrough intelligence including identifying new 
targets previously unknown to law enforcement, providing new leads on 
serious and organised crime activity, and identifying significant fraud 
against government programs.
126
 
4.82 Mr Patrick Walsh raised concerns in his submission about funding for Fusion. 
He noted that it was not clear whether the funding for Fusion will be ongoing or 
subject to the extent to which federal and state agencies that participate 'feel they can 
continue to support staff participating in the centre'. In this regard, Mr Walsh argued 
that:  
The government should consider (pending an internal independent review 
of fusion centre) giving the ACC core funding in an ongoing capacity for 
the maintenance and future information technology procurement of the 
centre. It should also consider funding at least partially agencies who 
participate in the centre.
127
  
4.83 Acting Deputy Commissioner Hudson of the NSW Police Force added that 
the ACC's Fusion capability is 'probably unparalleled in other law enforcement 
agencies'.
128
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CHAPTER 5 
The Australian Criminal Intelligence Model  
5.1 This chapter considers the proposed Australian Criminal Intelligence Model 
(ACIM), its strategy, principles and approach.  
Background to the Australian Criminal Intelligence Model  
5.2 The Organised Crime Strategic Framework Overview (OCSF) identifies a 
need to establish an organised crime intelligence model.
1
 The ACC was tasked by the 
Heads of Commonwealth Operational Law Enforcement Agencies (HOCOLEA) to 
lead the development of the model. The aim of the model is to provide clarity and 
consistency of standards, processes and protocols for intelligence-led policing and law 
enforcement work to enhance the national picture of organised crime. The ACIM is 
expected to enable the ACC and its partners to align activities more effectively while 
providing guidance and understanding of shared methodologies, ideas and goals.
2
 The 
vision is that of an intelligence partnership for a safer Australia with the ACIM 
expected to secure the free flow of criminal intelligence across the domains of 
national security, serious and organised crime, and policing and community safety.
3
   
5.3 In 2010–11, the ACC began planning the ACIM to meet the demands of all 
stakeholders from national security to community policing.
4
 An Australian Criminal 
Intelligence Forum (ACIF) comprising representatives of the 17 involved agencies 
was established with responsibility to oversee development and implementation of the 
model.
5
 The ACC stated that:  
[The ACIF] for the first time in Australian history, holds the mechanism for 
eight states and territories and many Commonwealth agencies to agree to 
principles of intelligence practice and to communicate their sometimes 
unique or divergent goals of achieving excellence in the criminal 
intelligence function nationally.
6
  
5.4 The development of the model is closely linked to the ACID/ALEIN scoping 
study which is assessing opportunities to harness technological advances to better 
enable management of ACC criminal intelligence holdings.  As part of this study, the 
ACC has benchmarked criminal intelligence models, frameworks, practices and 
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procedures in Europe and North America to identify ground-breaking intelligence 
standards and capabilities.
7
  
Endorsement of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Model  
5.5 The ACC Board and the Standing Council on Police and Emergency 
Management endorsed the proposed ACIM in September 2012 and November 2012 
respectively.
8
 Formal endorsement represented the culmination of nearly 'two years of 
developmental work, negotiation and agreement by intelligence professionals 
representing seventeen Commonwealth, State and Territory agencies'.
9
 Endorsement 
was reached by 15 agencies represented on the ACC Board together with CrimTrac 
and the Australian New Zealand Policing Advisory Agency (ANZPAA). 
5.6 The ACC's State Manager, Mr Ben McDevitt, informed the committee that by 
endorsing the proposal, the board 'signed off on several elements which lead to an 
intent, an underlying philosophy and a desired end state for the management of 
criminal intelligence'.
10
 The significance of the endorsement by all 17 agencies was 
highlighted by Mr McDevitt who noted that:  
The key feature of it is that those 17 agencies are drawn from three different 
operating environments, so we have the policing and community safety 
regime or domain, the serious and organised crime domain and the national 
security domain. What we found prior to this model is that there is 
significant difficulty even within those domains to get information and 
intelligence flowing freely—for example, from police service to police 
service.
11
 
5.7 Mr McDevitt explained that having signed off on the concept of the model, 
the focus of the ACC Board would now shift to developing processes, protocols, 
technologies, agreements and the legislative realities of sharing information and 
intelligence.
12
  
5.8 The ACC identified four key milestones in relation to the ACIM's 
implementation with endorsement the first. The others include the establishment of the 
ACIF to oversight the implementation of the ACIM and a reporting and accountability 
regime by way of ACIF reporting twice yearly to the ACC Board.
13
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Vision for the Australian Criminal Intelligence Model 
5.9 The model is recognised by the ACC CEO, Mr John Lawler, as the means by 
which Commonwealth, state and territory law enforcement agencies can see 
intelligence and intelligence processes through the same lens in order that:  
…when we are talking about intelligence concepts, intelligence processes, 
intelligence training and intelligence systems we have commonality in the 
way that that is constructed and indeed agreed standards and processes.
14
 
5.10 Mr Lawler explained that the optimum criminal intelligence environment 
which the model seeks to establish is one in which:  
…technology is available to facilitate information sharing through more-
complementary systems, where there is a commitment by agencies to 
quickly and effectively collect, analyse and share relevant intelligence and a 
collaborative culture of intelligence sharing to support decision-making 
across agencies and across operating domains.
15
 
5.11 The optimal state in relation to criminal intelligence is described by the ACC 
as a context in which: 
 criminal intelligence will be treated as a national asset and agencies share a 
responsibility to provide information and intelligence;  
 criminal intelligence technology will be fit for purpose and exist across 
agencies and jurisdictions providing efficiencies and cost savings;  
 legislation frameworks will enable the free flow of intelligence across 
agencies and jurisdictions; and 
 an organisational culture will ensure a correct balance between the principles 
of 'need to know' with 'responsibility to provide'.
16
  
5.12 Such an optimal state will lead to:  
Improved understanding of, and more effective responses to, the threat and 
impact of serious and organised crime.
17
    
Australian Criminal Intelligence Model principles and strategic objectives  
5.13 Mr McDevitt explained that there are three underlying principles which 'help 
us to get a philosophy' for the model: 
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 intelligence must be customer focused and requirements driven;  
 information and intelligence should be collected once and used often; and  
 information security requirements should be balanced to enable the right 
people to access the right information quickly, securely and from the right 
sources.
18
 
5.14 The model has as its guiding principles, seven strategic objectives: 
1. Ensuring quality intelligence supports tactical, operational and strategic 
decision-making to ensure more effective responses. 
2. Inculcating a culture where security requirements are balanced and 
information generated and held by individual jurisdictions and the 
Commonwealth is valued as a national asset for all. 
3. Establishing common standards, processes and protocols for managing 
intelligence assets, enabling more effective sharing across domains. 
4. Professionalising the intelligence discipline through development of 
national standards for intelligence practitioners and analysts, leading to 
improved quality of intelligence outputs. 
5. Embedding an agreed national threat, harm and risk assessment 
methodology to ensure a consistent approach across jurisdictions. 
6. Pursuing common technical and security architectures for information 
and intelligence holdings to improve intelligence collection, analysis and 
sharing. 
7. Maximising the value of fusion and technical analysis capabilities.
19
  
5.15 Each of the strategic objectives is underpinned by a series of action items 
which are collectively directed at embedding the model. The ACIF, as the body 
responsible for managing the development and implementation of the model, is 
currently drafting an implementation plan which will include the action items required 
to achieve the strategic objectives.
20
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Figure 2: Australian Criminal Intelligence Model  
 
Source: Australian Crime Commission, Submission 10, p. 25. 
Intelligence cycle 
5.16 The intelligence cycle under the ACIM is a process which 'describes the 
standard steps used to transform raw data and information into value-added 
intelligence'.
21
 The ACC noted that the ACIF focused its first five meetings around the 
issue of the intelligence cycle, identifying best practices and issues that required 
resolution at each phase of the cycle.
22
 
5.17 The ACIM intelligence cycle is a five step process: 
1. plan, prioritise and direct––discussions are held to identify the issue or theme 
that requires further investigation; 
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2. collect and collate––searching for data and information which is grouped to 
identify intelligence gaps and convergences for further analysis; 
3. analyse and produce––assessing, validating, adding value to and judging 
information to transform it into intelligence for reporting purposes; 
4. report and disseminate––sharing intelligence to support and advance the 
decision making process vis-à-vis the formal dissemination of reports and 
products; and  
5. evaluate and review––re-examination of activities and the value of 
intelligence outcomes with a view to identifying opportunities for 
improvement.
23
 
5.18 These five steps were endorsed by all involved agencies. The ACC stated that 
this 'common approach improves understanding of the phases of the intelligence 
cycle, ensures consistency, facilitates sharing and improves the flow of intelligence 
across and between agencies'.
24
 The ACC provided details of each of the five steps 
using a previous illicit drug project. The planning phase will consider information 
already gathered through other relevant inquiries and the collection phase may entail 
physical surveillance, coercive hearings, financial investigations and the use of covert 
sources. Collation involves evaluation of the material gathered to establish its 
accuracy and reliability and the organisation of that material in a way to reveal the 
links and associations across individuals, organisations and methodologies. The third 
phase requires agencies to analyse the material and produce briefings and information 
reports. The fourth phase, reporting and dissemination, involves provision of material 
to involved stakeholders while the final phase entails feedback on quality, value to 
decision-makers and outcomes for intelligence clients.
25
 
Governance arrangements  
5.19 A number of ACIF subgroups have been established to manage 
implementation of the action items and initiatives identified within the Australian 
Criminal Intelligence Strategy and the implementation plan (which is currently under 
development). Each subgroup is responsible for a phase of the intelligence cycle.  
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Australian Criminal Intelligence Forum subgroups and activities 
Subgroup Strategic objective focus and initiatives                               
(ongoing & implemented) 
Plan, prioritise 
and direct 
 Strategic objectives 1 and 5. 
 National Criminal Intelligence Priorities and 'setting the framework 
through negotiation across agencies'. 
 Introduction of a National Target System (NTS) for assessment of 
individuals and groups.
26
 Realising strategic objective 5, processes 
and protocols for national threat, harm and risk assessment have 
been agreed to and implemented through the NTS. 
Collect and 
collate 
 Strategic objectives 6 and 7. 
 Development of the Request for Information (RFI) capability 
including a standard definition of RFIs, priority rating scale, set of 
key words, naming conventions, metadata standard fields and 
business rules.  
 Development of a National Criminal Intelligence Product 
Directory including a standard product definition, set of key words, 
naming conventions, metadata standard fields and business rules.  
Analyse and 
produce 
 Strategic objective 3. 
 Training standards, competencies, common product definitions, 
common terminology and key words, liaison with ANZPAA which 
is developing Education and Training Guidelines for Police 
Intelligence. Establishment of national training standards and 
competencies which are expected to guarantee that analysts have 
the skill sets required to provide accurate and justifiable 
intelligence.
27
 
Report and 
disseminate 
 Strategic objective 2. 
 Legislative issues for information sharing.  
Evaluate and 
review  
All strategic objectives to examine lessons learned and 
methodologies to measure the value of intelligence. This will 
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provide additional checks and balances for the accuracy of data, 
information and intelligence on the system.
28
 
Source: Australian Crime Commission, Answers to written questions on notice, No. 4 
and No. 6, received 28 March 2013.  
Identified challenges 
5.20 Noting that the model's basic strategy and structure are in place, Mr Lawler 
informed the committee that the model as it currently stands is a concept agreed on 
paper which needs practical implementation.
29
  
5.21 The previous chapter provided some insight into the numerous challenges 
before the ACC and stakeholder partners in developing the model. Mr Lawler 
explained that the model would have to address matters at the highest level to ensure 
that 'the infrastructure underpinning intelligence processes is recognised and agreed to 
by everybody' to the lowest and most basic level of establishing a universal 
understanding of 'how you describe the intelligence cycle'.
30
 Given the complexities 
involved, development of the model is expected to take several years. Mr McDevitt 
commented that this is a considerable task and he recalled the difficulties in 
establishing a national DNA database which is, by comparison, 'simply a very small 
slice of intelligence'.
31
 
5.22 The ACC identified a number of key challenges in relation to criminal 
intelligence which the proposed model could address. While promoting recognition of 
criminal intelligence as a national asset—something that is collected once and used 
often for the benefit of many and therefore adds value to the decision-making 
process—the challenges to establishing a national holding identified by the ACC 
include: 
(a) securing national agreement and commitment to secure the free flow of all 
criminal intelligence as identified in the ACIM; 
(b) establishing a culture whereby security requirements are balanced and 
information generated and held by individual jurisdictions and the 
Commonwealth is shared as a national asset;  
(c) providing the appropriate technology, policy and legislation to support the 
sharing of intelligence between agencies across the three domains of national 
security, serious and organised crime, and policing and community safety; and  
(d) greater recognition of the transnational and borderless nature of contemporary 
organised crime.  
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5.23 The three critical success factors which will determine whether these 
challenges are met include:  
 a policy and legislative framework to facilitate information sharing;  
 improved technical capabilities; and  
 a culture of national intelligence sharing.
32
 
5.24 This chapter considers each of these challenges and their components, current 
discussions in relation to them and progress made towards addressing them.  
Securing the free flow of all criminal intelligence 
5.25 The ACC argued that addressing the various challenges to the collection, use 
and sharing of intelligence will require changes to the way in which stakeholders view 
criminal intelligence and how they go about collecting, collating, analysing, 
producing, disseminating and sharing it. According to the ACC, the proposed solution 
to these varied challenges is the ACIM and supporting strategy. The ACC argued that 
the model meets the requirements of OCSF capability 1.3 to provide clarity and 
consistency of standards, processes and protocols for intelligence-led policing and law 
enforcement work to enhance the national picture of organised crime. Further:  
The Model and Strategy support management of criminal intelligence more 
holistically through collaborative use of best practices, standards and 
competencies, technology, committees and forums (culture), and policy and 
legislation initiatives to empower information sharing and enhance criminal 
intelligence capabilities at all levels of law enforcement (including policy 
and regulatory agencies) in Australia.
33
 
5.26 In relation to the evolution of the model and supporting strategy, the ATO 
noted that as the strategy is still under development, 'the full identification of 
impediments and opportunities to maximise the usefulness of criminal intelligence 
are, at this time, yet to be fully realised'.
34
 However, some important steps have 
already been taken. The 17 involved agencies have agreed that all their intelligence 
products be subject to a universal classification system and put into broad categories 
of strategic, operational and tactical products. To underpin this agreement, common 
templates and common language will be used to describe the products. As part of this 
important step towards establishing common arrangements, the agencies have agreed 
to: 
…create a place where we can actually put those products, or at least put 
metadata relating to those products, so that we can each search on the 
collective repository of intelligence that actually resides there.
35
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Request for Information capability 
5.27 Efforts are also underway to establish a national Request for Information 
(RFI) capability which was identified by witnesses to the inquiry as a fundamental 
requirement. Under the current system, information regarding criminal histories and 
warnings regarding persons of interests for operational police are delivered through 
the CrimTrac National Police Reference System (NPRS). The ACC argued that while 
the NPRS provides 'accurate and timely information to operational police which 
greatly assists in ensuring officer safety', the RFI capability is a 'more complex 
capability aimed at streamlining the sharing of value-added intelligence products'.
36
 
Furthermore, currently, agencies develop their own questions and then send them to 
the relevant agency for a response. Under the proposed RFI arrangements, an agency 
will be able to send their questions to multiple agencies and the information generated 
through the question and answer process will be accessible to all agencies. 
Mr McDevitt explained: 
The problem for us as a collective is that the questions asked are not 
retained, and neither are the answers that are given. So what we are doing is 
creating a lot of movement and activity, and intelligence and information is 
moving between agencies, which is a good thing, but it is happening in a 
very inefficient way. We do not have the re-usability factor that we are 
after. We want intelligence and information to be collected once and then 
utilised often for multiple purposes.
37
  
A culture of national intelligence  
5.28 Culture is one of the key areas of focus under the model. The ACC argue that 
the agreement of 17 agencies to develop a national criminal model to achieve a freer 
flow of intelligence across and between agencies and domains is a 'big step forwards 
in terms of culture'.
38
  
5.29 The strategy is directed at producing an accurate picture of criminality in 
Australia through 'cultural norms to instil a collaborative attitude which ensures 
sharing is business as usual'.
39
 One of the primary cultural shifts required to achieve 
this strategy will be for agencies to view intelligence as a national asset rather than 
belonging to a single agency. Mr McDevitt noted that the model would not get far if, 
despite potentially having the 'best automated technologies around', agencies made a 
decision not to contribute.
40
  
5.30 Mr McDevitt also emphasised that a culture currently exists whereby the 
principle of the 'need-to-know' overrides any sort of principle of a 'responsibility to 
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provide' intelligence. This culture has contributed to a situation in which the bulk of 
what is currently shared is transactional-type data and information. He explained that: 
It might be information on things like criminal history, missing persons or 
people who are wanted on warrants, which is very transactional data that 
moves around.
41
 
5.31 Notwithstanding this reality, Mr McDevitt recognised that the cultural trends 
in relation to intelligence sharing are fluid: 
We are seeing a shift on that scale now and an acknowledgement of the fact 
that we actually do need to move more closely towards a responsibility to 
provide criminal intelligence so that the right agencies and the right 
individuals have the right intelligence in front of them at a particular point 
in time. We saw this as an issue that has come out inquiry after inquiry, 
including the 9/11 Commission of Inquiry. You see that snippets or pieces 
of intelligence, if brought together, would have given decision makers an 
advantage that they did not otherwise possess because the intelligence 
tended to be siloed.
42
 
Appropriate technology, policy and legislation  
5.32 The model's management strategy recognises the need for policy and 
legislation to 'underpin effective powers and processes for agencies to quickly and 
effectively collect, analyse and share relevant intelligence'.
43
  
Technology  
5.33 Technology is recognised as one of the key elements underpinning the model. 
A number of initiatives have been undertaken to understand existing and required 
technologies.  
ACID and ALEIN Scoping Study 
5.34 A Proceeds of Crime funded scoping study was initiated in 2010 to examine 
further options for the provision of ACID and ALEIN capabilities. As part of the 
scoping study, the ACC is exploring the technology requirements for a criminal 
intelligence database which will inform the model's development. Matters including 
interoperability with existing capabilities, connectivity between agencies' databases 
and the technologies required to exploit data on current systems are some of the issues 
under consideration. Mr McDevitt noted that there were three requirements in relation 
to technology: 
…we want to be able to enrich the data that we have and exploit it, we want 
to be able to add value to it, and we want to be able to generate new leads 
and opportunities out of the data. We also want to be able to have some sort 
of monitoring and alerting capability.
44
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5.35 Mr McDevitt recognised the diversity of approaches on the part of 
participating agencies which apply different technology and use different databases 
for intelligence purposes. He went on to comment that the Tasmania Police made a 
policy decision to use ACID as its primary database for collecting and analysing 
criminal intelligence rather than establish a separate intelligence database. As noted in 
the previous chapter, other states and territories have different approaches to criminal 
intelligence and different systems for capturing, storing and sharing it which is 
reflected in the volume of information and intelligence passed on to ACID. 
Mr McDevitt explained:  
So they [Tasmania] would contribute everything, nationally, whereas other 
jurisdictions and other agencies have already established databases of their 
own that they tend to utilise, and they make their own decisions about what 
they might choose to upload from their own databases into the national 
holdings.
45
 
5.36 Similarly, at the time the national DNA database was established, a number of 
police jurisdictions maintained their own DNA databases. However, Mr McDevitt 
informed the committee that the stage has been reached now where: 
…almost all police services have recognised that the best benefit—the best 
bang for the buck financially and otherwise—is to have a single national 
repository that they all contribute to.
46
 
5.37 A report on the final scoping study is expected by the end of June 2013 with 
the implementation of any recommendations subject to funding availability.
47
 
National Information and Intelligence Needs Analysis 
5.38 Alongside the ACID and ALEIN scoping study, a National Information and 
Intelligence Needs Analysis (NIINA) was undertaken by the ACC, National Counter-
Terrorism Committee's Intelligence and Information Management System Working 
Group and CrimTrac. The NIINA agencies consulted over 200 practitioners about 
their needs and examined the intelligence systems used by each agency.  
5.39 In addition to these initiatives, the AFP's Spectrum Program is under 
assessment in light of ACIM user requirements.
48
 As part of the Spectrum Program, 
the AFP is reviewing the information technology requirements and business processes 
to enhance its intelligence and case management capability. Through the program, the 
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AFP is developing interoperable systems to facilitate secure information sharing with 
partner agencies.
49
 
5.40 Mr McDevitt noted that while the phases of the model have already been 
agreed upon, 'we require smart technologies to be able to collect and collate the 
masses of information and data that we are actually dealing with'. In addition, smart 
technical tools are also required to ensure that the intelligence captured can be fully 
exploited.
50
  
5.41 In relation to the storage of information and intelligence under the model, 
Mr McDevitt informed the committee that:  
What is being proposed under this model is not so much to look specifically 
at any existing database or system but more to design, develop and 
implement the technologies that are required at each stage of the model. So, 
for collection and collation, for example: what automated collation abilities 
do we need, what connectivity to what existing systems and databases do 
we need to actually be able to collect automatically where possible that 
intelligence and information? You then go on to the analysis and 
production, and that is about smart analytical tools.
51
  
5.42 The system should enable the police officer on the street to access a database 
to upload information onto it as well as withdraw information from it without having 
to enter data into multiple databases. The challenge is to draw on emerging technology 
as well as technology currently in use. One example of technology currently in use is a 
default on intelligence databases. The NSW Police, for example, have set up such a 
default on their systems in order that data uploaded on their system will automatically 
upload onto ACID.
52
 
5.43 The committee understands that there are a number of initiatives underway to 
consider the information technology requirements of the ACIM including the 
ACID/ALEIN scoping study and review of the AFP's Spectrum Program. The 
committee recommends that the ACC provide it with a detailed report on the findings 
and recommendations of these respective studies and how they will inform the 
development of a national criminal intelligence repository.  
Recommendation 1 
5.44 The committee recommends that the Australian Crime Commission and 
the Australian Federal Police provide it with a detailed report on the findings 
and recommendations of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Database (ACID) 
and Australian Law Enforcement Intelligence Network (ALEIN) scoping study, 
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National Information and Intelligence Needs Analysis, and assessment of the 
AFP's Project Spectrum. The report should provide details on: 
 the recommendations regarding ACID and ALEIN and how they will be 
implemented including a timeframe;  
 the outcome of the National Information and Intelligence Needs Analysis; 
 the assessment of the AFP's Spectrum Program; and  
 how the recommendations of each respective review and assessment will 
inform the development of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Model 
and maximise interoperability between existing databases and systems. 
Recommendation 2 
5.45 The committee recommends that the Australian Crime Commission 
(ACC) as the lead agency on criminal intelligence and the Australian Criminal 
Intelligence Model (ACIM) provide it with a report on how the ACC will ensure 
that all current information technology systems are fully utilised and accessible 
under the ACIM.  
Legislation  
5.46 One of the primary challenges to a national criminal intelligence model is the 
complex legislation at state, territory and Commonwealth level whereby negotiation 
with the different, overlapping and multiple legislative regimes is required to get 
intelligence in and out.
53
 Another key matter is that of intelligence obtained under 
different regimes and powers. There are strict rules concerning intelligence gleaned 
from coercive hearings while different regimes exist in relation to intelligence 
obtained from telephone intercepts or other electronic surveillance. Mr McDevitt 
described the current situation as one in which:   
…you get a very rich picture in the middle, but it is extremely difficult to 
share that because of the rules that are attached to each piece of intelligence 
that comes in to make up that picture.
54
 
5.47 Mr Lawler also noted the complexities in addressing legislative barriers and 
obstacles at the Commonwealth, state and territory levels. He informed the committee 
in September 2012 that while the model was at that time about to be presented to the 
Standing Council on Police and Emergency Management (SCPEM), the legislative 
requirements themselves in relation to implementing the model were anything but 
clear: 
There is a question, even, about whether police ministers have the 
jurisdictional authority to commit to such a significant endeavour and 
whether there is a compact of some other nature that is required here to 
ensure that what the board of the Australian Crime Commission, and its 
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15 representatives, believe to be in the national interest, is actually set on 
very solid foundations.
55
  
5.48 However, in response to a written question on notice, the ACC clarified that 
formal endorsement by the SCPEM and ACC Board resolved the issue of authority to 
commit. The ACC further noted that while agencies have already committed to the 
ACIM, any uncertainty that emerges is in relation to 'compatibility of legislative 
frameworks that govern agency ability to share'. The dynamics are such that:  
 No single agency has authority over all of the multiple legislative frameworks. 
 States and territories must comply with their own jurisdiction's legislative 
framework and they only have authority over their own jurisdiction.  
 Commonwealth agencies must comply with a different set of Commonwealth 
legislative frameworks.  
5.49 In light of these dynamics, the challenge for the ACIM becomes how to 
coordinate the legislative requirements of each framework to align and facilitate a 
freer flow of intelligence and information among agencies.
56
  
5.50 Mr Lawler commented that the legislative challenges are multifaceted and that 
many such challenges originate with the ACC itself: 
Some of the legislative challenges actually start within the commission 
itself and some of the legislative challenges have a very sound basis. Of 
course, the commission in the exercise of its powers—we have very 
intrusive powers that have been entrusted to us by parliament—has 
constraints on whom that information can be shared with. There are very 
strict legislative arrangements in place. I would like to give the committee, 
if I could, a sense of the legislative constraint within the commission itself.  
I am not saying that this is inappropriate constraint; I am just saying that 
this is the totality. [The ACC has]… a 21-page draft disclosure checklist, 
which is a checklist in relation to the fact that each piece of information that 
leaves the commission has to be completed and signed off. It takes into 
account the multitude of various acts and provisions that have to be 
considered and what the implications of those provisions are before 
information can be disseminated to our partner agencies.
57
 
5.51 The disclosure checklist is designed to identify the point of origin of 
information that is received by the ACC and to ensure adherence to any laws around 
that information. This process becomes complex when that information contributes to 
a package that is disseminated by the ACC to other agencies.
58
  
                                              
55  Mr John Lawler, ACC, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 46.  
56  Australian Crime Commission, Answer to written question on notice, No. 8, received 
28 March 2013.  
57  Mr John Lawler, ACC, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 48.  
58  Dr David Lacey, ACC, Committee Hansard, 14 March 2013, p. 4.  
70  
 
5.52 The legislative requirements of contributing agencies will determine what is 
shared and how it can be shared. Data is also held by the ACC and can be used by 
other agencies under the ACC's legislation. As the ability to share intelligence differs 
according to legislative requirements relating to each partner agency, the challenge for 
the model will be to ensure that all agencies have equal rights to access information 
generated under the model. The ACC's Mrs Harfield explained:  
That is why it is not necessarily about putting all the information into one 
place, where everybody has equal rights of access, but making sure that you 
construct your architecture so that it deals with all those nuances. Over 
time, you might then decide that you want to deal with the differences from 
a legislative perspective so that you have some standardisation, but you 
would not necessarily have to do that at the beginning…It would not make 
it an open-ended opportunity for anybody to access any information: all the 
protocols around rights of access, levels of classification of the material—
and we deal with those issues all the time now.
59
 
5.53 The ACIF report and dissemination subgroup has collected information 
regarding agency legislative requirements as they relate to sharing data, information 
and intelligence. It will examine these legislative requirements with a view to 
reconciling the various legislative requirements and to identify possible solutions to 
enable the freer flow of intelligence and information.
60
 
Policy  
5.54 It was noted by the ACC that one of the most critical moments in relation to 
the development of the model was the agreement reached on the part of all 17 
agencies to contribute intelligence and factual data. The ACC commented that the 
collective contribution of raw data alone from the 17 agencies without any analysis of 
it would 'probably give us a richer picture than what we had' about an entity.
61
 To this 
extent, data and information will be contributed to the centre for utilisation by 
respective agencies. In addition: 
Where possible, agencies like the Australian Crime Commission try to add 
value to the contributions that are brought in from multiple sources, analyse 
that and subsequently develop products that can be shared. As an example 
of an agreement on what we are going to share, the Australian Criminal 
Intelligence Forum has now agreed that all agencies will put all of their 
strategic products into the middle.
62
  
5.55 Mr McDevitt informed the committee that most of the participating agencies 
have their own strategic products such as environmental scans and criminal analysis of 
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particular themes which they have agreed to contribute under the model to enable 
agencies to search against that information.
63
  
5.56 The ACC argued that the ACIM and its strategy are the first steps towards the 
development of a universal methodology for criminal intelligence. Within these key 
documents, the NTS has been implemented, an intelligence cycle which represents a 
standard methodology for analysis of criminal intelligence has been agreed to and 
ACIM principles underpin criteria for how criminal intelligence should be treated 
across agencies. Furthermore, the ACC argued that:  
The agreed ACIM strategic objectives (once all actioned) will provide rules 
for regulating how intelligence is managed.
64
  
Dealing with transnational and borderless contemporary organised crime 
5.57 The current intelligence landscape comprises state, territory and federal law 
enforcement agencies (including policy and regulatory agencies) which operate within 
and across three intersecting domains—national security, serious and organised crime, 
and policing and community safety. Criminal intelligence, as the linkage between the 
three domains underpins an ability to understand these complex criminal 
environments and to identify threats, determine priorities and develop preventive 
response strategies.
65
  
5.58 Mrs Harfield explained the rational for drawing in the three domains under the 
model: 
Crime is linked through those domains in a way that means that information 
is separate, even though those paths move in parallel, means that there are 
gaps. It is about how you can make the relevant things accessible to the 
relevant people based on the intel questions that they need answered, even 
if they do not necessarily recognise them as intelligence questions. They 
might describe them in some other way as information or data, but actually 
it adds to an intelligence picture for people that they can then use in a 
practical circumstance.
66
  
5.59 The ACC's submission emphasised the need for 'increased sharing with the 
ACC and its partners (including those offshore) of intelligence regarding foreign 
criminal groups, individuals and non-state actors that impact on Australia'.
67
 Dr David 
Lacey, ACC Executive Director, People, Business Support and Stakeholder Relations, 
further clarified that:  
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One of the key mitigating strategies in looking at finding common points of 
interface of information and intelligence for all to benefit from is to 
mitigate the prospect that there might be an alleged criminal act in one state 
while another enforcement agency may have pertinent information that 
connects critical pieces of information, intelligence and evidence. Without 
having that national nexus point, the risk of not joining dots is significantly 
great. That is also a critical component of having the strategy in place—to 
risk-mitigate that prospect. We have a violence and sexual offending 
information repository that seeks to serve that purpose where perpetrators 
cross borders. And key information and intelligence is available for others 
who are part of that particular networking system to connect to.
68
 
National Criminal Intelligence Fusion Capability  
5.60 Mrs Harfield drew a parallel between the Fusion capability and the ACIM in 
terms of vision and operability rather than scale. She noted that Fusion contained an 
alerting and monitoring capability which could be targeted at specific groups, 
individuals, network or targets. This capability is complemented by an ability to 
search across data and collect information from agencies that will then 'build an 
automated pattern for you that will trigger alerts'.
69
 Therefore: 
… if you have a particular issue that a partner organisation wants to look at, 
we can construct through the data architecture a way to automatically 
trigger an alert against that issue when you see it. That might be a piece of 
information about how somebody is managing a particular aspect of their 
finances, for example.
70
 
5.61 The model recognises the importance of drawing on Fusion and other 
technical analysis capabilities under its seventh strategic objective. The objective 
notes the importance of assessing opportunities and deploying technologies to 'better 
exploit federated technologies to collect, collate and share intelligence across 
domains'.
71
 
Supporting initiatives  
5.62 The ACC lists five key initiatives that go to the national interest of which the 
ACIM is the first. Others include an upgrade of ACID which the ACC recognised as: 
…essential in order to ensure it is capable of maintaining and exploiting 
national criminal intelligence holdings as envisaged in the ACC Act, noting 
that resources will be required to realise such an upgrade.
72
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5.63 ACID and ALEIN, as well as other databases and networks including the 
child sex offenders register, DNA database and the National Police Reference System 
database of persons of interest will remain separate resources to the model database.
73
 
ACID is used in relation to serious and organised crime whereas the model impacts on 
a wider range of criminality across different domains.  
5.64 Mr McDevitt explained that accessibility was another reason for this decision. 
He emphasised that interoperability between databases and systems and accessibility 
to them was more important than providing a single repository of intelligence:  
Under this model you may have something whereby, for example, some of 
the discussions we have had have been where I go onto a factually based 
data set like the National Police Reference System and I look up the name 
Ben McDevitt. If it is there, I will see the factual data, I will see the link to 
the fingerprint database that I can then follow to the fingerprint database. I 
can see that DNA has been taken and that can be linked back to where the 
DNA identifying information is held. And I can perhaps see a link to ACID 
or another intelligence database that is held by the ACC. So the information 
intelligence does not have to be in one repository; in fact there is good 
reason for it not to be. I think the key is accessibility to it for those who 
have good reason to need to be able to see it.
74
 
5.65 Other key initiatives include the establishment of an administrative 
accountability mechanism. Legislative change can remove barriers to sharing of 
intelligence, particularly to those agencies that can help deliver long-term prevention 
outcomes. However, administrative mechanisms must also be established to ensure 
that high levels of accountability are imposed upon agencies which contribute 
intelligence to the national holdings.
75
  
Stakeholder views 
5.66 Notwithstanding the fact that most stakeholders before the committee are 
represented on the ACC Board and have endorsed the proposed model in its current 
largely undeveloped state, some placed qualifications on that support. Acting Deputy 
Commissioner Hudson of the NSW Police Force informed the committee that there 
would be widespread support for the ACIM if it is able to establish some consistency 
in relation to what is captured, how it is treated and delivered to a central depository 
as well as how that intelligence is then utilised.
76
  
5.67 Other police jurisdictions including the Queensland Police Service and 
Victoria Police were concerned as to how to balance their own priorities in relation to 
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volume crime with that of organised crime.
77
 Acting Deputy Commissioner Pope of 
the Victoria Police emphasised that while his police force was committed to national 
consistency in relation to criminal intelligence and considered organised crime to be a 
priority (for which a significant part of its intelligence capability had been committed) 
the reality is that volume crime is the most significant issue before the Victoria 
Police.
78
 These and other concerns raised by law enforcement stakeholders as well as 
the ACC's response to them are the subject of the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Challenges to an Australian Criminal Intelligence Model 
6.1 As the national body for collecting and disseminating criminal intelligence, 
the ACC recognised that the proposed ACIM will provide the solution to many of the 
identified impediments. Under the ACIM, criminal intelligence is viewed as a national 
asset which can be collected once and used often and seeks to establish an 
interoperable system for the free flow of criminal intelligence based on consistent 
standards, processes and protocols. However, some submitters cautioned against the 
free flow of intelligence and argued for greater checks and safeguards on intelligence 
sharing. Conceptualising intelligence as a national asset also raised questions 
regarding controls on information sharing and access, including overall responsibility 
for, and ownership of, the intelligence and supporting data.  
6.2 These matters go to the central question of whether the proposed ACIM can 
address the impediments identified by involved agencies, while maintaining 
appropriate checks and balances on criminal intelligence gathering and sharing. Other 
key issues brought to the fore during the inquiry have a direct bearing on reform to the 
criminal intelligence sharing environment. This chapter details those matters and the 
ACC's response to them.   
A definition of criminal intelligence and universal methodology 
6.3 The recently released Australian Criminal Intelligence Management Strategy 
(ACIMS) provides a definition of criminal intelligence. This is supported by the 
ACC's definition of both information and intelligence. The committee supports efforts 
to provide a definition to support the ACIM and encourages ongoing discussion on the 
distinctions between information and intelligence. These discussions are important 
because the ACIMS definition was not acknowledged by witnesses during the course 
of the inquiry. Furthermore, as many law enforcement agencies who gave evidence to 
the committee emphasised the importance of common terms and standards, there is a 
strong emphasis across involved agencies to ensure common understanding as the 
basis on which to build commonly agreed standards and processes. This intention is 
captured by the ACIMS which noted that all involved agencies are 'dedicated to 
nationally consistent methodology for the management of criminal intelligence'. The 
ACIMS also states that the ACIM and ACIMS provide an agreed set of common 
standards, best practices, and information sharing protocols for management of 
criminal intelligence assets.
1
  
6.4 Witnesses to the inquiry supported the development of a clear, practical 
definition of criminal intelligence that will underpin a common methodology and 
ethos.
2
 A universal methodology was highlighted as important for reasons including 
                                              
1  Australian Criminal Intelligence Management Strategy 2012–15, tabled by the Australian 
Crime Commission at a public hearing on 14 March 2013, p. 3. 
2  Detective Chief Superintendent Colin Cunningham, South Australia Police noted for example 
that there was a need for further definition. Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 38. 
76  
 
the fact that intelligence is the subject of subpoena for criminal trials.
3
 Some witnesses 
highlighted the need for consistent application of intelligence gathering and sharing 
methods and argued in favour of the ACIM dictating to users how they should collect, 
collate and disseminate intelligence.
4
 Others underscored the importance of 
establishing a centralised way of classifying information to avoid a situation in which 
a piece of information is treated differently in different jurisdictions and by different 
agencies.
5
 To this end, establishment of a clear information management strategy 
which presents information that meets the needs of its users and applies common data 
standards was seen as fundamental.
6
  
6.5 Many witnesses noted that interoperability was dependent upon a standardised 
code directory that can operate across systems.
7
 Mr Doug Smith, CEO of CrimTrac, 
explained that standardisation goes to matters as simple as providing a standardised 
way of writing down a person's name given that different formats are used in different 
jurisdictions:  
With some police forces you would put the given names and then the 
surname in capitals. Other police forces would mandate that you put the 
surname and a comma and then the given names. To share information in a 
way whereby it is easy to share, you need actual data standards. In dealing 
with Asian names and Arabic names, there is a huge conversation that 
needs to be had on how you will actually gather those for official purposes 
…The point I am trying to make is that to get greater potential from the 
data that is kept locally you need to make it visible in a way that is 
consistent—in other words, driving on the same side of the road.8 
6.6 As noted in the previous chapter, the ACIF 'collect and collate' subgroup is 
developing a National Criminal Intelligence Product Directory and a RFI capability. 
Both the directory and RFI capability are expected to include a standard product 
definition, set of key words, naming conventions, metadata standard fields and 
business rules. The committee appreciates that development of both capabilities will 
address many of the obstacles which have hindered the timely sharing of criminal 
intelligence.  
6.7 Many other law enforcement agencies also highlighted the importance of 
standardisation in approach, processes, systems and training.
9
 However, the 
                                              
3  Acting Deputy Commissioner Jeff Pope, Victoria Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 
2012, p. 3.  
4  Detective Chief Inspector Colin Cunningham, South Australia Police, Committee Hansard, 
27 September 2012, p. 40. 
5  Acting Deputy Commissioner David Hudson, NSW Police Force, Committee Hansard, 
27 September 2012, p. 28.  
6  Mr Michael Pezzullo, ACBPS, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 9.  
7  CrimTrac, Submission 4, p. [6].  
8  Mr Doug Smith, CrimTrac, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, pp 25–26.  
9  Mr Patrick Walsh, Committee Hansard, 31 October 2012, p. 6. 
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committee was concerned that a number of police jurisdictions had recently invested 
in new criminal intelligence methods, strategies and supporting infrastructure 
apparently without consideration for a standard approach or the impact on sharing 
intelligence. The committee sought the ACC's advice on how the ACIM would 
address the varying approaches across involved agencies.   
ACC response  
6.8 The ACC responded that the ACIM proposes to use a building block 
approach. In addition, emphasis has been placed on agencies to review and align their 
own systems with ACIM standards and principles. According to the ACC, this 
approach has already achieved some successes:  
 WA Police have undergone a review of its intelligence function and used the 
ACIM as a benchmark. Its intelligence model is under redevelopment to 
achieve alignment with the ACIM.  
 Queensland Police Service is reviewing and restructuring its intelligence 
function by using the ACIM as a benchmark.  
 While Victoria Police only recently completed its own intelligence doctrine and 
will not review its processes in the foreseeable future, it has confirmed that its 
doctrine aligns with that of the ACIM.   
 ANZPAA is using the ACIM as a benchmark in the development of Education 
and Training Guidelines for Police Intelligence.
10
 
Committee view  
6.9 The establishment of the ACIM involves solving complex policy problems, 
some of which are resistant to resolution and will require persistence. At present, law 
enforcement agencies describe the model and its purpose differently because they 
apply their respective interpretations of the intelligence cycle and of intelligence 
terms.
11
 The committee appreciates that numerous efforts are underway to encourage 
agencies to move from their respective agency standpoint to establish common 
understanding of the intelligence cycle based on common terms and definitions. 
Formal endorsement of the intelligence cycle is an important step in this regard. 
However, the committee also recognises that without the practical application of 
universally agreed terms and processes, further development of the model will be 
extremely difficult. For this reason, the committee strongly encourages ongoing 
initiatives and dissemination of a clear, working definition of criminal intelligence and 
descriptions of key terms. Ensuring that all agencies share the same understanding and 
expectations of the model is critically important as negotiations and discussions on 
key aspects of the model progress and will minimalise confusion or misperceptions 
going forward.  
                                              
10  Australian Crime Commission, Answer to written question on notice, No. 12, received 
28 March 2013.  
11  Mr Ben McDevitt, ACC, Committee Hansard, 14 March 2013, p. 10. 
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Recommendation 3 
6.10 The committee recommends that the Australian Criminal Intelligence 
Forum (ACIF) develop for the endorsement of all 17 Australian Criminal 
Intelligence Model agencies an information management strategy. As a first step 
in developing the strategy, the ACIF should define key terms including a clear, 
working definition of criminal intelligence and provide descriptions of relevant 
concepts and processes. 
A criminal intelligence repository  
6.11 One of the key questions that arose during the course of this inquiry was 
whether a repository of criminal intelligence should take the form of a unitary or a 
federated model. Within this discussion, the question of whether CrimTrac could 
serve as the agency responsible to manage the national repository was raised.  
6.12 There were a number of options raised in evidence including: 
 Police Google whereby the data is left in the jurisdiction which gathered it 
and is made available to each user through a federated search engine. The FBI 
in the United States is an example of this type of system.
12
 
 One centralised database whereby users go to the centre to upload data and 
draw intelligence. An example of this system is the National Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System.
13
 
 A system whereby each jurisdiction houses its own database with a supporting 
centralised database into which information is contributed. The National 
Criminal Investigation DNA Database is a case in point.  
Determining factors 
6.13 Some of the key determining factors for selecting the most appropriate 
repository for criminal intelligence raised in evidence include: 
 legislative impediments, sovereignty, jurisdictional ownership and privacy 
considerations; 
 avoiding silos of information dependent upon individual arrangements;
14
 
 provision of real-time intelligence and avoiding duplication of effort;  
 appropriate clearances and filtered access;
15
  
 accountability mechanisms including audit trails;
16
 and 
                                              
12  Detective Superintendent John Pointing, Queensland Police Service, Committee Hansard, 
27 September 2012, p. 36.   
13  Mr Doug Smith, CrimTrac, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 24.  
14  Mr Mark Burgess, PFA, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 1.  
15  ACPBS argued for a federated system with filtered access. Mr Michael Pezzullo, ACBPS, 
Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 10.  
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 accommodating international operations which involve foreign jurisdictions.
17
 
Legislative impediments, sovereignty, jurisdictional ownership, and privacy  
6.14 Evidence before the committee suggested that the sovereignty of data was a 
primary consideration in determining the most appropriate repository. The first and 
most important question in this regard is to determine what agencies can share 
legally.
18
  
6.15 It was put to the committee that one of the primary advantages of avoiding a 
central database with Commonwealth managed data is that the issues of jurisdictional 
ownership, sovereignty and privacy do not become the problem of the agency 
managing the central repository.
19
 In contrast, under a federated model, once a 
particular jurisdiction agreed that certain aspects of its data holdings should be shared, 
addressing legislative and other constraints becomes a matter for that jurisdiction.
20
 In 
addition, each agency is then responsible for managing the integrity of information 
and intelligence they access and use.
21
  
6.16 Mr Pezzullo of the ACBPS argued in favour of a federated system whereby 
federal, state and territory along with international partners share 'enterprise 
architecture' or 'information architecture'. Within a federated system, agency leaders 
are accountable to optimise both their reach into that federated system and their 
contribution to that federated system.
22
 Mr Pezzullo explained how the system would 
work: 
Here are the different holdings of information. They are held in these 
repositories and they are labelled. There is aviation data here, there is 
biometric data there, there are facials here and fingerprints there. And 
subject to the objects of your agency and the limitations that might be in 
your legislation and my legislation—within that federated system—we can 
enter into a structured arrangement where we can turn on as much or as 
little as you want. We can depersonalise it, we can filter it or we can give 
you the whole load, depending on your particular requirements. 
Within that single architecture, you are much better off creating, to use a 
shorthand reference, a 'free market of arrangements', which are still fettered 
by law—privacy and other disclosure provisions—and then letting the 
                                                                                                                                            
16  The PFA argued that an accountability trail which could track which agencies access what 
information can be established as soon as a user agency enters a common portal to access 
information. It would also make it far easier to track who had access to information that was 
ultimately misused. Mr Mark Burgess, PFA, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 4.  
17  Mr Michael Pezzullo, ACBPS, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 10. 
18  Mr Doug Smith, CrimTrac, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 24.  
19  Mr Doug Smith, CrimTrac, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 25. 
20  Mr Doug Smith, CrimTrac, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 25. 
21  Commander Alf Fordham, WA Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 44.  
22  Mr Michael Pezzullo, ACBPS, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 11.  
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agencies mobilise around their interests. That is certainly how we did it in 
the Australian intelligence community. 
6.17 The ACIM approach to addressing the question of a repository model is 
clearly focused on identifying the respective legislative impediments as a first step.   
The ACC's Mr McDevitt observed that incremental progress would be made as 
specific legislative impediments were identified. However, he also recognised that 
sharing: 
…starts to become a whole lot more complicated when intelligence or 
information goes into the middle and then is disseminated beyond and they 
[contributing agencies] are not able to act to track where it originally started 
from, in terms of their contribution.
23
  
6.18 Evidence to the committee also highlighted the need for a consistent approach 
and uniform standards in relation to information contributed to the ACIM which 
becomes the subject of legal processes including Freedom of Information (FOI) 
requests and subpoena. FOI legislation which varies across jurisdictions was 
recognised as one of the legislative impediments to sharing information.
24
 A concern 
raised in relation to it was that an FOI request that is refused in one jurisdiction may 
then be made to agencies in other jurisdictions that have access to the relevant data 
through the ACIM or to the ACIM host agency.
25
 Noting that intelligence is often the 
subject of subpoena for criminal trials, witnesses also highlighted the importance of 
universal standards regarding intelligence including how it is managed and protected.   
6.19 The committee recommends that the AGD review disclosure of information 
procedures under FOI across the Commonwealth, states and territories. The AGD 
review should provide recommendations for a consistent approach to dealing with FOI 
requests under the ACIM. As intelligence contributed to the ACIM may be subject to 
subpoena, the committee also recommends that the AGD review standards that can be 
applied to information contributed to the ACIM and its management which will 
protect the intelligence and direct agencies how to manage, share, store and destroy 
ACIM information. The committee recognises that these reviews may overlap with 
work underway by the ACC and the ACIF and its respective subgroups and 
encourages collaboration between them wherever appropriate.  
Recommendation 4 
6.20 The committee recommends that the Attorney-General's Department 
conduct a review of disclosure of information procedures under Freedom of 
Information (FOI). The review should provide recommendations on any 
legislative, administrative or policy reforms required to achieve a consistent 
                                              
23  Mr Ben McDevitt, ACC, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 45.  
24  Acting Deputy Commissioner Jeff Pope, Victoria Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 
2012, p. 3. Chapter 4 details the evidence on this matter.  
25  Acting Deputy Commissioner Jeff Pope, Victoria Police, Committee Hansard, 27 September 
2012, p. 3. 
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approach to FOI requests for information under the Australian Criminal 
Intelligence Model.  
Recommendation 5 
6.21 The committee recommends that the Attorney-General's Department 
review law enforcement data security management practices, standards, 
principles and safeguards. The review should provide recommendations on: 
 standards and uniform principles for the security and integrity of 
information contributed to the Australian Criminal Intelligence Model 
(ACIM). These standards should detail how ACIM agencies are to hold, 
protect, secure and manage ACIM intelligence; and  
 an accountability and oversight mechanism to monitor compliance with 
the uniform standards and principles.  
Provision of real-time intelligence and avoiding duplication of effort 
6.22 The Queensland Police Service and ASIC highlighted the importance of real-
time criminal intelligence as a key factor in determining the preferred model. 
Detective Superintendent Pointing explained that agencies should be able to make a 
request for information through a search engine that can access information from 
every other jurisdiction contemporaneously. He argued that such a system would 
provide a lot more safety to the police on the street, because the operational police 
would know immediately where the dangers were, as well as any additional 
information that may assist in decision making.
26
 Detective Superintendent Pointing 
argued that the police Google option would be the most time-efficient for this reason: 
If we all had access to each other's systems, with appropriate clearances, 
audit trails et cetera, through a federated search engine or some other, for 
want of a better term, 'police Google', it would save a lot of time. We would 
be able to interrogate each other systems and use what we need. The audit 
trail is there for governance and we do not have people typing out requests 
and sending faxes. It would save a lot of time.
27
 
6.23 Similarly, Mr Geddes of ASIC highlighted the need for the model system to 
provide real-time access to other agencies' information.
28
  
Interoperability and avoiding silos of information dependent upon individual 
arrangements  
6.24 The NSW Police Force emphasised the importance of output over the type of 
system used. Acting Deputy Commissioner Hudson argued that what was of greatest 
importance was interoperability between the systems rather than whether data should 
                                              
26  Detective Superintendent John Pointing, Queensland Police Service, Committee Hansard, 
27 September 2012, p. 36.  
27  Detective Superintendent John Pointing, Queensland Police Service, Committee Hansard, 
27 September 2012, p. 36.   
28  Mr Mark Geddes, ASIC, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 32.  
82  
 
be centrally stored or not. Emphasising centralised access over centralised storage of 
information, he noted that the National Names Index was not a centralised database 
but that user agencies use it as a repository to access each other's information on it.
29
 
6.25 Mr Geddes of ASIC envisaged a system whereby agencies could overlay 
elements of the NCTR or other products and then see how they match up with the 
regulated population to identify activities that would not ordinarily show up as 
nefarious or related to criminal agencies or enterprises.
30
 
6.26 One of the important considerations raised was that of avoiding a situation 
where detective constables or ACBPS officers at relatively junior levels have to go 
through the transaction impediments of filling out forms and questioning who to direct 
their query to. Mr Pezzullo of the ACPBS argued that a federated system with 
connectivity between the respective depositories would avoid this circumstance.
31
 
6.27 The AFP's position was that if there were a national database containing the 
bulk of information, huge efficiencies would automatically be realised given that the 
current context is one in which the AFP, with its national jurisdiction, must deal with 
each state and territory individually.
32
 At the same time, Assistant Commissioner 
Morris highlighted that each police force in Australia has already made 'substantial 
investments in their databases and their case management systems' and that:  
As we try to look at ways we might be able to build this together into a 
more coherent approach, you are not going to expect some of those police 
services to walk away from a system that they have just invested many 
millions of dollars in. We are going to have to wait until they become 
redundant and then perhaps have the architecture to say, when you replace 
that system, if it has certain characteristics, so it can talk to others and be 
part of a federated system.
33
 
6.28 Assistant Commissioner Morris further noted that the extent to which 
agencies will share is dependent upon how well the intelligence functional process is 
integrated into each agency's operations which:  
…varies from agency to agency. In some it is kept a little bit at arm's 
length. In others it is very well integrated right into the operational side of 
the business.
34
  
ACC response 
6.29 The ACC acknowledged that the model database might look something like a 
police Google whereby the user can search multiple databases simultaneously but that 
                                              
29  Acting Deputy Commissioner David Hudson, NSW Police Force, Committee Hansard, 
27 September 2012, p. 29.  
30  Mr Mark Geddes, ASIC, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 34.  
31  Mr Michael Pezzullo, ACBPS, Committee Hansard, 27 September 2012, p. 10. 
32  Assistant Commissioner Timothy Morris, AFP, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 35.  
33  Assistant Commissioner Timothy Morris, AFP, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 36. 
34  Assistant Commissioner Timothy Morris, AFP, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2012, p. 38.  
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ultimately there would have to be strict business rules built into the system. Such rules 
would ensure that constraints placed on particular databases by a jurisdiction or 
agency would prohibit the search engine from accessing those databases.
35
  
6.30 However, the ACC explained that:  
Given the volume of data in existing databases and the different stages 
agencies are at in their technology life cycles, the ACC is still considering 
options for a national repository.
36
  
6.31 The ACC also noted that as the options analysis was yet to be completed, the 
strengths and weaknesses of each possible option was yet to be fully evaluated. While 
the ACC commented that a federated model appeared to the ACC to be the least 
disruptive of options, it also noted that such a model comes at a higher cost whereas a 
centralised model:  
…provides the avenue for nationally agreed standards and workflows, 
thereby creating a synergy between business and IT convergence leading to 
increased sustainability and long term efficiency and effectiveness gains; 
reducing management overheads and costs appreciated by the central 
organisation and its partners.
37
  
6.32 Notwithstanding this argument, the ACC concluded that the challenge for 
both federated and unitary models is 'how to reconcile the various legislative 
frameworks for the state, territory and Commonwealth information and intelligence 
assessed'. This is the question before the ACIF 'report and dissemination' subgroup.
38
 
In order to address the 'multiple legislative frameworks that govern agencies ability to 
share' and the current technical limitations, an examination of the various legislative 
frameworks across law enforcement agencies is currently underway. At the same time, 
different technological options and methods to address the lack of interoperability are 
under consideration. Underpinning these discussions is the implementation of the 
National Request for Information capability which will provide efficiencies with 
respect to information sharing processes.
39
  
Committee view  
6.33 The committee appreciates the complexity in establishing a repository that 
provides for timely intelligence, interoperability across the respective agencies and 
complements to the fullest extent possible current databases and information 
management systems. While the committee recognises the simplicity in the police 
                                              
35  Mr Ben McDevitt, ACC, Committee Hansard, 14 March 2013, p. 10.  
36  Australian Crime Commission, Answer to written question on notice, No. 14, received 
28 March 2013.  
37  Australian Crime Commission, Answer to written question on notice, No. 14, received 
28 March 2013.  
38  Australian Crime Commission, Answer to written question on notice, No. 14, received 
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Google option, it also appreciates that any national repository for criminal intelligence 
will have to accommodate the various legislative frameworks while also taking into 
account ownership and data management issues. But whatever model is chosen, the 
committee is of the view that a national repository of some form is essential.  
Recommendation 6 
6.34 The committee recommends the establishment of a national repository 
for criminal intelligence as part of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Model.  
Recommendation 7 
6.35 The committee recommends that a cost-benefit analysis be undertaken in 
relation to the options for a national repository. This analysis should take into 
consideration: 
 the determining factors detailed in Chapter 6 of this report;  
 the need to complement existing information technology initiatives such 
as the AFP's Spectrum Program; 
 the need for interoperability and complementarity with current 
databases including the National Criminal Investigation DNA Database 
and the National Automated Fingerprint  Identification System; and  
 the intelligence sharing model used by the Australian intelligence 
community.   
Single national security classification standards 
6.36 A major impediment to the sharing of information and intelligence is the lack 
of consistency in security standards. However, release of a simplified security 
classification system under the information security management protocol in July 
2011 provided an opportunity for law enforcement agencies to develop compliant 
protective security policies including classification guides under the protocols. Under 
the new system, which removed the distinction between national and non-national 
security information, emphasis is placed on information security management 
including safeguarding confidentiality, integrity and the availability of information 
over document handling. Under the program, agencies have until July 2013 to phase 
out old classifications.  
6.37 The committee was assured that the Commonwealth's initiative to standardise 
security classifications in relation to data across all agencies was well underway. 
Assistant Commissioner Morris of the AFP explained that 'whether you are an 
intelligence agency, defence or law enforcement we will be using a common set of 
security classifications'. He further explained that there were two steps that needed to 
be completed:  
The first is the classifications and the second is we have invested a lot of 
money in the last few years building a top-secret and secret network around 
Australia. So never before have the AFP, at least, been so well connected 
into classified information which is vital for us on a variety of crime 
matters.  
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What we have done is made sure that access to that is located in our joint 
counter-terrorism team, so our state and territory counterparts have access 
to this information as well. So, in many respects, in terms of the national 
approach and access to classified information, we have never been in a 
better position. And in one state—I won't name which particular one—they 
have never had a chance to get access to this information; now they have 
their police officers there. They need to get security clearances as well to 
access this information—that is the other side of the coin here.40 
6.38 Acting Deputy Commissioner Pope explained that in Victoria, changes at the 
Commonwealth level in relation to national security standards will have to be adopted 
and then applied to the policing context.
41
 Assistant Commissioner Kershaw of the NT 
Police also noted that changes would have to be made to its current system which is 
not accredited. As an additional consideration, the NT Police have shared service 
arrangements with the NT Government which would have to be taken into account in 
the shift to a nationally consistent standard.
42
  
6.39 Other agencies explained some practical operational challenges in the move 
towards the national classification system. Commander Fordham of the WA Police 
explained that there was a conflict between its own classification system and 
Commonwealth-based classifications because much state-based information is 
operationally sensitive and not necessarily secret, top secret, highly protected or 
protected. He gave a practical example to make the point:  
We may have a squad of 70 officers who are dealing with an issue and all 
of them will know what is going on. They have to, because they have a 
need to know. When we provide that to the Commonwealth system it will 
get classified to a level where, strictly speaking, we cannot give that 
information to the very people who are generating it. I do not see that as 
being a roadblock; I see that as being a pothole that we need to work on. 
But I do not see it as being a stopper to achieving the outcome that we all 
think we should achieve.
43
 
6.40 While acknowledging that agencies are progressing towards a standard 
classification process and will move to a standardised clearance process, the ACC 
argued that lack of standardisation was not a major inhibitor to information and 
intelligence sharing. The ACC commented that despite the fact that there was no 
equivalent to the standardised Commonwealth process for security clearances for 
officials using the Australian Government Security Vetting Agency (AGSVA), states 
and territories make use of Commonwealth clearing processes. However, the primary 
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inhibitors are the time the process takes and the associated costs.
44
 Yet the ACIM 
incorporates into its business processes the use of Commonwealth classification 
standards. Therefore, supporting initiatives include educating the states and territories 
on the standardised Commonwealth security clearances process (using AGSVA) and 
engaging the Commonwealth clearance process to clear state and territory taskforce 
and seconded members as and when required.
45
 
Committee view  
6.41 The committee appreciates that moving to a national classification system for 
state and territory jurisdictions is a complex and resource-intensive process. 
Notwithstanding this fact, the evidence to the committee overwhelmingly supports a 
single classification standard and the committee fully supports the Commonwealth 
initiative in this regard. Furthermore, the committee recognises standardisation in 
relation to intelligence as the foundation of a strong and effective ACIM. For this 
reason, it strongly encourages all state and territory jurisdictions to align their security 
clearances processes with that of the AGSVA.  
Recommendation 8 
6.42 The committee recommends the standardisation of security clearance 
processes. To this end, the committee strongly encourages all state and territory 
jurisdictions to align their security clearance processes with that of the 
Australian Government Security Vetting Agency.  
Should the provision of information be mandatory or voluntary?  
6.43 Mr Burgess of the PFA informed the committee that one of the main 
inhibitors to intelligence flow is the lack of a mandatory obligation to share 
information.
46
  The PFA argued that a legislated requirement to share would counter 
any concerns that sharing information might breach some type of privacy rule or 
process.
47
 The PFA's Vice-President, Federal Agent Jonathan Hunt-Sharman 
continued:  
Everyone would be far more comfortable if there was a clear piece of 
legislation that said, for example, that the government agency heads have to 
report suspect criminal activity affecting their department.
48
 
6.44 Similarly, Mr Patrick Walsh in his submission supported a system whereby 
nationally significant intelligence is shared on a mandatory basis between law 
enforcement agencies. He explained that:  
                                              
44  Australian Crime Commission, Answer to written question on notice, No. 18, received 
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It should be mandatory for the two higher categories of national criminal 
intelligence collection requirements to be shared on a common criminal 
intelligence database that all agencies can contribute to and exploit. This 
will require greater leadership between federal and state police ministers 
and attorney-generals to sign MOUs that will drive this process.
49
  
6.45 The WA Police encouraged consideration as to whether intelligence sharing 
should be made compulsory.
50
 The Victoria Police argued in favour of a 'cautiously 
mandated' approach which would need to address the technical challenges and entail 
significant national investment at the Commonwealth and state levels.
51
 While the SA 
Police raised the question of whether having one agency compel others to give 
intelligence would be palatable to the wider community.
52
  
6.46 The AGD noted that the Commonwealth could only request that the states and 
territories share information, whereas it could be mandated for Commonwealth 
agencies but would need to have regard to respective secrecy provisions and whether 
they would cut across each other. Mr Anderson of the AGD further argued that there 
were already a range of bodies in place at different levels to promote collaboration 
including the Senior Officers' Group on Organised Crime and that a mandatory 
requirement was not necessary.
53
  
6.47 Rather than a mandatory approach, the AFP supported a reciprocal obligation 
to share information and reform processes as opposed to a dual responsibility which 
exists for use and supply of intelligence. While recognising a legislated obligation as 
probably a step too far, Assistant Commissioner Morris explained that agencies are 
obliged to contribute intelligence to the collective because they take and exploit 
intelligence from collective databases. He drew on Europol to make the point: 
If you want to benefit from the collective knowledge that the law 
enforcement agencies of 27 countries contribute to the overall intelligence 
holdings, if you want to enjoy that benefit, you also have to contribute.
54
 
6.48 Other witnesses highlighted the importance of building on growing 
confidence in an effective system as the impetus for sharing rather than mandatory 
participation. While supporting a mandatory approach, Mr Patrick Walsh observed 
that it could be avoided if a database was established with appropriate security levels 
which achieved harmonisation between state and federal legislation regarding retrieval 
and storage of information.
55
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ACC response 
6.49 Mr McDevitt of the ACC emphasised the importance in having agencies 
recognise for themselves the value in contributing and sharing intelligence rather than 
mandating their participation:  
I do not think that you can legislate or prescribe for them to share; I think 
the reality is that they need to see the benefit in sharing and see that they are 
getting what you are talking about in terms of a value-add—hopefully from 
actually putting into the middle.
56
 
6.50 Mr Lawler further highlighted the importance of a national capability where 
all involved agencies 'want to and need to access the system for the value that the 
system can provide to them'. The consultative approach taken to developing the ACIM 
is directed at ensuring voluntary participation and thereby enabling cultural change. In 
contrast, mandating or forcing agencies to use the system is a very different 
proposition to that of a willingness to engage.
57
  
6.51 Recognising the need to ensure that the information contributed to the ACIM 
is used by all involved agencies, Mr Lawler argued for strong accountability 
mechanisms. These might include the transparent, independent, high-level 
examination of information-sharing across the model as a middle ground between a 
mandatory and voluntary approach.
58
 He argued that accountability systems and 
oversight would provide visibility over which agencies are contributing and how.
59
 
This information would then inform discussions on methods to improve sharing.  
Committee view  
6.52 The committee appreciates that frustration with current intelligence-sharing 
arrangements underpins the argument for a mandatory approach. Evidence to the 
committee emphasised that a mandatory approach to intelligence sharing would be 
complex, difficult to achieve and only encompass Commonwealth agencies.  
6.53 The committee supports the consultative approach taken in relation to the 
development of the ACIM which strives to establish a system owned by involved 
agencies who uphold a common commitment to contribute and share intelligence. The 
committee's view is that this commitment should be formalised. The committee 
recognises a national repository as essential in providing an effective means to share 
information and produce timely criminal intelligence to prevent, detect and disrupt 
serious and organised crime. Unless there is a strong impetus to share, the risk is that 
the current gaps in national efforts created through limited information exchange and 
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59  Mr Ben McDevitt, ACC, Committee Hansard, 14 March 2013, p. 7.  
 89 
 
the siloing of information identified in the National Security Statement in 2008 will 
remain.
60
  
6.54 The committee supports the establishment of a formal requirement achieved 
through licencing or other administrative arrangements which requires agencies that 
are signatory to the national repository to formalise a commitment to contribute 
information and intelligence. This agreement must be supported by a strong 
accountability and oversight regime to ensure that agencies are accountable for their 
contribution to the national holdings. As part of this regime, the Senior Officers' 
Group on Organised Crime (SOG on OC) could provide oversight reports to the 
Ministerial Council for Police and Emergency Management—Police (MCPEMP) and 
Standing Committee of Attorneys-General (SCAG) on the contribution of each 
respective agency for review and remedial action where required.  
Recommendation 9 
6.55 The committee recommends that the Australian Crime Commission in 
collaboration with the Attorney-General's Department establish as part of a 
licencing requirement to the national repository or other administrative 
arrangement, a formal agreement which requires signatory agencies to declare a 
commitment to contribute information and intelligence to the national holdings.  
Recommendation 10 
6.56 The committee recommends the establishment of an accountability and 
oversight regime to ensure that agencies are accountable for their contribution to 
the national holdings. As part of this regime, the Senior Officers' Group on 
Organised Crime (SOG on OC) should provide an annual oversight report to the 
Ministerial Council for Police and Emergency Management—Police and 
Standing Committee of Attorneys-General on the contribution of each respective 
agency for review and remedial action where required.  
Data management and integrity  
6.57 The committee raised questions during the course of the inquiry regarding 
ownership and management of data and methods to uphold the integrity of intelligence 
systems. A number of Commonwealth, state and territory agencies provided numerous 
examples of how their data and databases are efficiently managed and monitored. This 
evidence was supported by the ACC which argued that the current protections and 
security arrangements for classified information are strong.
61
  
6.58 The following three matters came to light during the inquiry in relation to data 
management:  
 responsibility for the integrity and accuracy of the data; 
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 monitoring transfer of data and controls around accessibility; and  
 considerations regarding the weight or importance given to specific data 
within a national repository.  
6.59 Assistant Commissioner Kershaw of the NT Police argued that the agency 
responsible for supplying information into a central repository must ensure that what 
they are contributing is the most accurate, up-to-date information possible. While he 
recognised the ACC as the most likely agency to manage a national repository, each 
individual jurisdiction should be held responsible for the information it inputs into the 
system.
62
 In Victoria, for example, the Commissioner for Law Enforcement Data 
Security imposes standards on Victorian law enforcement in relation to how data is to 
be held: 
When our data is shared with agencies it also imposes similar standards on 
those agencies to hold, protect, secure and manage Victoria Police 
information and intelligence as we do within Victoria. There needs to be 
some legislated minimum standards that are going to adequately protect the 
intelligence and dictate how we manage, share, store and destroy our 
information.
63
 
6.60 In terms of accountability mechanisms, AUSTRAC's holdings are provided to 
its 40 agency clients through an online system. Every search conducted by an 
Australian-based agency is logged and AUSTRAC is able to retain detailed records of 
every search and every activity that is undertaken on the database.
64
  
6.61 Drawing on current arrangements, Dr Lacey of the ACC explained that 
intelligence was treated at the point of the lowest common denominator which is the 
information from which intelligence is derived. To disseminate intelligence, each 
source of information which contributed to the intelligence must be considered 
'because of the various legislative frameworks that the information imposes, from a 
protection perspective and from a handling perspective'.
65
 
6.62 These considerations relate to the weight or importance given to one specific 
piece of intelligence over another and how this may be accommodated under a 
nationalised system. Drawing on current arrangements, Mr Lawler explained to the 
committee the manner in which intelligence is tested on the admiralty scale:
66
  
Some intelligence will be A1 in that it can be corroborated, it might be 
sworn testimony and it might have very high levels of authenticity and 
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reliability. Then other information that might come from a single source 
that is unknown will be of a much lower quality and be much less reliable, 
and we are likely to have everything in between that. 
The purpose of the intelligence process is to use that information and build 
upon it so that it produces an assessment or a judgement—a professional 
judgement—undertaken by professional intelligence analysts that goes to 
inform. In some ways, it is not a matter of absolute truthfulness or absolute 
inaccuracy. These are assessments that are made based on a variety of 
pieces of information by professional people to say that in our professional 
judgement we think X or Y. That is how the intelligence process works in a 
very simplistic form.
67
 
6.63 Mr McDevitt also observed that this rating system allows those using the 
intelligence to make informed judgements about the weight the ACC should attach to 
a particular piece of intelligence.
68
 Furthermore, in circumstances where intelligence 
was circulated to agencies and then subsequently found to be unsubstantiated or 
inaccurate, a further report would be circulated stating that the material was untruthful 
or was discredited.
69
  
6.64 Concerns have been raised by state and territory law enforcement agencies 
regarding the Threat Risk Assessment Methodology (TRAM) used to assess national 
targets. In response to these concerns, the ACC conducted a review of TRAM, 
utilising the ACIF to work with Commonwealth, state and territory agencies to 
identify their needs. As a result of the review, a new national process which 
incorporates 'eighteen variables with equal rating to quantitatively measure threat and 
to generate a risk rating' has been established. It is being implemented as part of the 
National Target System (NTS) which is currently being rolled out across Australian 
law enforcement agencies.
70
 
6.65 Other issues of concern include the fact that law enforcement and other 
government agencies are vulnerable to corruption by reason of their use or knowledge 
of information technology systems and processes.
71
 
Cyber security measures, such as firewalls, passwords and anti-virus 
software, may have the unintended effect of increasing the threat of 
corruption from insiders in businesses and government agencies (IBM, 
2006). Most security measures are aimed at blocking attempts from 
outsiders to gain access to information being held within organizations. 
However, with increased levels of security, it may be easier for criminals to 
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corrupt insiders rather than devoting the considerable resources required to 
breach security measures externally.
72
  
6.66 While there are many ways in which information technology could be used to 
minimise risks of corruption, at the same time 'computerisation of procedures in the 
public sector could create new opportunities for bribery and illegality' which will need 
to be managed through initiatives such as integrity testing.
73
  
6.67 When concerns regarding data management and integrity were raised with the 
ACC, it noted that the ACIF is in the 'early stages of discussion with respect to 
accountability mechanisms and where responsibility will lie for ensuring the accuracy 
of data on the system'. As part of its considerations of various accountability 
mechanisms, ACIF have received a presentation on the EUROPOL model while 
discussions continue about 'accountability versus responsibility'. Underpinning this 
discussion is the question of whether instilling a responsibility to provide is preferred 
over an accountability system which would compel agencies to contribute.
74
 
Committee view  
6.68 The committee recognises that many Commonwealth agencies who have 
endorsed the ACIM are currently under the purview of Australian Commission for 
Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI). These include the ACC, AFP and ACBPS. 
CrimTrac will come under ACLEI's oversight from 1 July 2013. However, the 
committee is concerned that three Commonwealth agencies that have endorsed the 
model and will gain access to sensitive information and intelligence through the 
national repository are not subject to the oversight of the ACLEI.  
6.69 In 2011, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ACLEI recommended that 
limited ACLEI oversight under a 'second tier jurisdiction' be extended to a number of 
agencies including the ATO.
75
 In its response in February 2012, the Government 
noted the recommendation and clarified that: 
Before considering the inclusion of new agencies within ACLEI's 
jurisdiction, the Government considers that it is appropriate to allow 12 to 
l8 months for ACLEI to consolidate its existing jurisdiction following the 
inclusion of ACBPS. That experience can then be used to properly inform 
any further expansion of ACLEI's functions. 
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All of the agencies nominated by the Committee for inclusion as tier two 
agencies are subject to the Public Service Act 1999 and as such are bound 
by the APS Values and Code of Conduct. These agencies also have existing 
internal and external corruption prevention and investigation measures.
76
 
6.70 Noting the government's response, the committee recommends that the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on ACLEI (PJC-ACLEI) inquiry into the feasibility of 
extending ACLEI's jurisdiction to include ASIC, the AGD and the ATO. The 
committee recommends that the PJC-ACLEI consider whether these three agencies 
should be brought under ACLEI's jurisdiction on a whole-of-agency basis by 
regulation.  
Recommendation 11 
6.71 The committee recommends that the feasibility of extending the 
jurisdiction of the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity 
(ACLEI) to include oversight of the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, the Attorney-General's Department and the Australian Taxation 
Office be referred to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ACLEI for inquiry 
and report.  
Balancing national and state priorities  
6.72 In Chapter 5, the committee noted the concerns raised by some state and 
territory law enforcement agencies regarding the need to balance intelligence 
resources between organised crime and volume crime. Of central concern to law 
enforcement agencies is the need to work across national and local priorities and meet 
community and government expectations accordingly.
77
 
6.73 Victoria Police argued that it is committed to national consistency as 
evidenced by its adoption of the ACC national threat assessment methodology and 
commitment of a significant part of its intelligence capability to organised crime. 
However, the reality is that volume crime (including burglaries, theft of cars or from 
cars and property damage) is the most significant policing issue for the state. With 
over 300 000 incidents of volume crime committed in Victoria each year, such crimes 
consume a considerable amount of its police intelligence effort. In addition, matters 
including public order, family violence and road policing are the other significant 
issues for the Victorian police whose performance is measured by its ability to reduce 
volume crime to make a safer community for Victoria. For example, a current priority 
for Victoria Police is alcohol fuelled violence and youth offenders.
78
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6.74 Acting Deputy Commissioner Pope of the Victoria Police noted that the 
ACIM would need to take into account the fact that state police jurisdictions have 
different priorities and work across all forms of crime including organised crime, 
serious crime, volume crime, public order and road policing.
79
 The NT Police held a 
similar view noting that local issues highly rated within the Northern Territory are not 
national priorities. Assistant Commissioner Kershaw of the NT Police argued for a 
balance between local issues that impact on local communities with that of the 
nationally significant matters.
80
 Similar concerns regarding the need to balance state 
with federal priorities were raised by the Queensland Police Service and SA Police.
81
 
6.75 However, Commander Fordham from the WA Police emphasised the 
importance of moving away from a 'black and white serious and organised crime 
versus volume crime model'. He supported a flexible and adaptive model which could 
recognise that serious and organised criminals typically come from a volume crime 
environment. Flexibility within the model is required for these reasons. He continued:  
I think that, whilst there is absolutely no argument that some serious and 
organised criminals come into Australia, commit serious crime and leave 
Australia and fit within the very stereotypical definition of 'serious and 
organised crime', there are lots of serious and organised criminals that live 
in Australia, work within Australia and migrate between volume crime, the 
adaptive zone and serious and organised crime. So with ACC only 
concentrating on the serious and organised crime, it is a bit like a car and all 
you are concentrating on is the engine, while the car is actually the sum of 
its parts. I think it is incumbent upon the ACC to have the holistic picture of 
offending within Australia so that they can then, in an informed manner, 
concentrate on the consequences of serious and organised criminals and 
perhaps have a broader opportunity to interact and interfere and disrupt 
them in their activities.
82
 
ACC response  
6.76 As part of initial efforts to recognise local and state challenges, the ACIM's 
first strategic objective concerning quality intelligence to support 'tactical, operational 
and strategic decision-making' highlights the need to incorporate mechanisms for 
'identifying regional priorities within national collection plans'.
83
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6.77 The committee asked the ACC how the ACIM would enable state and 
territory law enforcement agencies to balance a commitment to the ACIM with their 
state priorities and resources. The ACC responded that over the past two years, the 
ACIF has negotiated the development of the ACIM and strategy with consideration to 
ensuring a balance between commitments to the ACIM with commitments to 
individual agency priorities. Other supporting initiatives include: 
 establishment of the ACIF as a representative and consultative body; 
 education and awareness of state and territory priorities to identify overlaps; 
 engagement with ACIF members to ensure adequate state and territory 
representation; 
 ACIF subgroup activities including that of the 'analyse and produce' subgroup 
which has explored various options including secondments across agencies to 
promote understanding and awareness across agencies, engagement of the 
ANZPAA to ensure alignment and input into the Education and Training 
Guidelines for Police Intelligence;  
 incorporation of state and territory concerns in the TRAM review and 
evaluation process; and  
 incorporation of jurisdictional requirements including crimes against persons 
in the new threat variables.
84
  
6.78 Furthermore, the ACC asserted that national and state priorities could coexist 
and that there would be some overlap of collection priorities as: 
The ACIF supports flexibility by providing the mechanism for eight states 
and territories and many Commonwealth agencies to communicate their 
sometimes unique or divergent goals and to agree a set of national 
principles for intelligence practice that are also aligned with their individual 
priorities.
85
 
Committee view 
6.79 The committee appreciates that law enforcement agencies across the states 
and territories are committed to the ACIM but remain concerned about how to balance 
national with local priorities and manage resources accordingly.  
6.80 However, the committee received convincing evidence that serious and 
organised criminality often emerges from a volume crime environment. It also 
recognises that criminal entities are able to exploit legislative, jurisdictional and policy 
gaps between the two by migrating between volume crime and organised crime. For 
these reasons alone, it is important that the ACIM as the national repository provide 
comprehensive intelligence on criminality in Australia. As the ACIM has been 
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specifically designed to prevent the siloing of information and intelligence by bringing 
together for the first time, policing, national security and serious and organised crime, 
the committee is confident that it is adequately flexible to accommodate intelligence 
emanating from these three domains regardless of whether they represent national or 
state priorities or the intersection of the two.  
 
  
 
CHAPTER 7 
Committee view and conclusions 
7.1 Evidence to the committee has highlighted the challenges and complexities in 
gathering and sharing criminal intelligence. Currently, Commonwealth, state and 
territory law enforcement agencies have their own systems, processes and approval 
mechanisms with limited interoperability to enable timely information sharing. For 
these reasons, the committee recognises that a national mechanism for the sharing of 
criminal intelligence is fundamentally important.  
7.2 The committee did not hear from a single submitter to the inquiry that did not 
support the introduction of some form of structural overhaul to the way criminal 
intelligence is shared and disseminated in Australia. While there were varying views 
about the respective roles of agencies in relation to the Australian Criminal 
Intelligence Model and about how the model would be structured, no single 
organisation or individual held the view that the status quo provided an adequate 
criminal intelligence system.  
Nature of contemporary law enforcement and the role of the ACC  
7.3 During the inquiry, the committee was informed that within the policing 
context, intelligence was traditionally considered to be of secondary importance to 
investigations and other policing disciplines. Yet, traditional policing methods are no 
longer able to meet the challenge of detecting and disrupting serious and organised 
crime.  Evidence to the committee detailed in chapters 2 and 4 of this report identified 
the ways in which criminal groups exploit legislative and policy gaps, geographical 
borders and state boundaries. Criminal entities exploit the current business model by 
moving between the spheres of volume crime and serious and organised crime. At the 
same time, cybercrime, which has been identified by the ACC as one of the greatest 
emerging threats to law enforcement demands a universal, collaborative and 
coordinated approach.
1
 
7.4 The establishment of an effective national criminal intelligence repository 
offers the possibility of closing legislative, geographical and information gaps in the 
pursuit of addressing organised crime. The committee takes the view that the 
establishment of an effective national criminal intelligence repository is of vital 
importance to the future of policing in Australia. A viable ACIM is fundamentally 
important to law enforcement efforts in preventing, detecting and disrupting organised 
crime. The funding and resourcing of the ACIM must reflect its importance.   
7.5 The committee acknowledges that as criminal intelligence is the core business 
of the ACC, the agency is committed to sustaining strong cooperative partnerships 
with all Commonwealth, state and territory agencies that have endorsed the ACIM. 
The committee supports the ACC's focus on criminal intelligence and partnership 
approach.  
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Committee endorsement and support  
7.6 There are no quick fixes or simple solutions to the sharing of criminal 
intelligence. The issues before the ACIF and its respective subgroups are complex not 
least because cultural change is part of the solution. Establishment of the ACIM will 
require broad, collaborative and innovative approaches and a need to build on 
common ground that has already been established. 
7.7 One of the key challenges for the ACIF which has come to light during this 
inquiry is the need to engage effectively with law enforcement agencies to ensure their 
involvement and investment in identifying the possible solutions. For their part, law 
enforcement agencies must keep in view the overall aim of the model, including 
interrelationships between a range of causal factors and policy objectives.  
7.8 The committee supports the ACIM and endorses efforts underway to develop 
its respective components. The committee highlights the concerns raised by the ACC 
CEO, Mr Lawler at its last hearing and recognises the need to build on successes in 
order identify common solutions and accommodate differences: 
I think there is a real risk that, despite all of the very good will of agencies 
and people now, for a whole raft of reasons, it could be side-tracked or 
unpicked in some way—and that would be a terrible shame for the health of 
this country.
2
  
Risks of maintaining the status quo  
7.9 There are considerable risks in maintaining the status quo in relation to 
criminal intelligence gathering and sharing. Many of these risks were highlighted in 
evidence concerning current practices. Witnesses such as Assistant Commissioner 
Morris of the AFP explained the consequence of not moving towards a national 
approach. He argued that: 
The other risks are that adversaries, whether they be terrorists or organised 
crime, are just going to leverage off new technologies even more. So we are 
going to fall behind. The other risks are that we compartmentalise and each 
of us are holding vital pieces of criminal intelligence that might hold the 
key to success for someone else's activities. These days I think of a 
tightening budgetary environment as well. There cannot be anything more 
important to us than being efficient with the dollars we have. A national 
approach to criminal intelligence, whatever databases come up with, is 
actually part of the road map to being far more efficient than perhaps we 
were in the past. Do one search on one entity, rather than 12 searches on the 
one entity. There are currently a lot of great automated analysis and data-
mining tools on the market. These are the types of capabilities that all law 
enforcement will require if they are going to have a chance of success in the 
future.
3
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7.10 Assistant Commissioner Morris also noted the importance of capturing all 
available information which current systems are unable to achieve: 
Obviously, if we keep doing business the way we have always done it, we 
will actually go backwards. That is clear. What we are seeing is far more 
information. People store more information these days. Previously, you 
might execute a search warrant and find a small telephone book. These 
days, everyone has a laptop, an iPad and a computer. So we are finding 
more information and processing more information. So we have to 
approach treating that information in far more sophisticated ways than we 
have done in the past; otherwise we will just be bombarded with 
information overload.
4
 
7.11 The committee believes that a national approach is required to criminal 
intelligence for a number of reasons including those identified by Commissioner 
Morris. The ACC acknowledged changes in the ways in which criminal intelligence is 
being used. Traditionally, intelligence informed tactical decisions regarding specific 
criminal entities such as determining criminal associations.
5
 In the current 
environment, criminal intelligence is used for multiple reasons and its impact stretches 
across all levels of the decision-making process. As criminal gangs do not operate 
within a business model and are much more fluid, flexible and responsive to 
opportunities than large organisations, addressing organised crime requires equally 
responsive and flexible solutions.
6
 A national system will ensure that there is no 
intelligence gap in the crossover that takes place when criminal entities become more 
sophisticated and start to legitimise their criminal activity through company structures.  
Risk appetite and partnership approach  
7.12 The committee appreciates the complexities and difficulties for the 17 
criminal intelligence agencies in establishing a national model. It recognises that 
flexibility and compromise on the part of agencies will be required. Furthermore, it 
understands that there may well be mistakes made along the way and shortcomings 
which will require readdress. For this reason, there must be a risk appetite for and 
appreciation of the potential benefits of reform which must overcome any threats that 
change will inevitably bring.  
7.13 Rather than being risk averse, involved agencies must appreciate that some of 
the matters before them are ambiguous, complex issues that may require experimental 
and innovative approaches. However, of central importance is that they invest in 
change, build on commonality and cooperate to provide for a fully accountable 
system. Mr Lawler noted in this regard that: 
Given that people will change over time and there will be different 
environments, there need to be systemic underpinnings of what we are 
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actually trying to do here and we need to somehow ensure that there is high 
level accountability to see that the journey that is started is, in actual fact, 
finished and that it moves from something that is on a piece of paper to the 
potentially futuristic model—as you described it—of the Queensland police 
around their Google system.
7
 
Information dissemination  
7.14 Important information in relation to the ACIF and subgroups only came to the 
committee's attention by way of specific written questions on notice. The committee 
appreciates that development of the ACIM is fluid and that there are multiple 
initiatives that are underway. However, as the ACIF reports twice yearly to the ACC 
Board, consideration should be given to simultaneous release of public information on 
progress. The committee also encourages the ACC to provide a detailed account of 
progress towards the ACIM including challenges before the ACIF in its annual 
reports.  
Recommendation 12 
7.15 The committee recommends that the Australian Crime Commission 
provide a detailed account of progress towards the Australian Criminal 
Intelligence Model in its annual reports.  
 
 
 
 
 
Mr Chris Hayes MP 
Chair 
                                              
7  Mr John Lawler, ACC, Committee Hansard, 14 March 2013, pp 10–11.  
  
 
APPENDIX 1 
Submissions, additional information and answers to 
questions on notice received by the committee 
Submission  
Number  Submitter 
1 Name Withheld  
2 Mr Patrick F. Walsh, Senior Lecturer, Intelligence and Security 
Studies, Charles Sturt University  
3 Attorney-General's Department  
4 CrimTrac 
5 Confidential 
6 Law Council of Australia  
7 Police Federation of Australia  
8 Confidential 
9 Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity 
10 Australian Crime Commission  
11 Civil Liberties Australia Inc.  
12 Australian Federal Police, Ministerial Policy and Governance  
13 Australian Securities and Investments Commission  
14 Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC)  
15 Australian Taxation Office  
16 Northern Territory Police, Fire and Emergency Services 
17 Speed and Stracey Lawyers Attachment 1Attachment 2  
 17A Supplementary Submission 
18 Australian Customs and Border Protection Service  
19 Department of Police and Emergency Management - Tasmania  
20 Confidential  
21 Western Australia Police  
22 Confidential  
23 Australian Federal Police Association 
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Additional Information Received 
1 Office of the Australian Information Commissioner - Privacy Factsheet 3, 4A 
Framework, received 10 September 2012 
2 Civil Liberties Australia - Court spikes Wickenby case, tabled at a public hearing on 
21 September 2012 
3 Australian Crime Commission - ACC has a legislative mandate to maintain the 
national picture of serious and organised crime, tabled at a public hearing on 21 
September 2012 
4 Australian Crime Commission - Australian Criminal Intelligence Model, tabled at a 
public hearing on 21 September 2012 
5 Australian Crime Commission - Australian Criminal Intelligence Management 
Strategy 2012-15, tabled at a public hearing on 14 March 2013 
 
Answers to Questions on Notice 
1 Answer to Question on Notice from the Australian Federal Police at a public hearing 
on 21 September 2012 
2 Answer to Question on Notice from the Australian Federal Police Association at a 
public hearing on 21 September 2012 
3 Answer to Question on Notice from the Australian Federal Police Association at a 
public hearing on 21 September 2012 
4 Answer to Question on Notice from Civil Liberties Australia at a public hearing on 
21 September 2012 has been received by the committee and accepted as 'in 
confidence'. 
5 Answers to Questions on Notice from the Australian Crime Commission at a public 
hearing on 14 March 2013  
  
 
APPENDIX 2 
Witnesses who appeared before the committee 
Friday, 21 September 2012 – Canberra ACT 
Police Federation of Australia 
Federal Agent Jonathan Hunt-Sharman, National President, Australian Federal Police 
Association; and Vice-President, Police Federation of Australia 
Mr Mark Burgess, Chief Executive Officer 
Mr Angus Skinner, Project Officer 
Civil Liberties Australia 
Dr Kristine Klugman, President 
Mr William Rowlings, Chief Executive Officer 
CrimTrac 
Mr Doug Smith, Chief Executive Officer 
Mrs Jane Diedricks, Senior Legal and Policy Adviser 
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 
Mr Johann Visser, Acting Executive General Manager, Intelligence 
Australian Federal Police 
Assistant Commissioner Timothy Morris 
Commander John Beveridge, Manager 
Mr Peter Whowell, Manager, Government Relations 
Australian Crime Commission 
Mr John Lawler AM APM, Chief Executive Officer 
Mrs Karen Harfield, Executive Director, Fusion, Target Development and 
Performance 
Dr David Lacey, Executive Director, People, Business Support and Stakeholder 
Relations 
Mr Ben McDevitt AM APM, State Manager, Queensland 
Law Council of Australia (via teleconference) 
Mr Tim Game SC, Co-Chair, National Criminal Law Committee  
Ms Rosemary Budavari, Co-Director, Criminal Law and Human Rights 
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Thursday, 27 September 2012 – Canberra ACT 
Victoria Police 
Mr Jeff Pope, Acting Deputy Commissioner 
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service 
Mr Michael Pezzullo, Acting Chief Executive Officer 
Mr Christopher Wall, Acting National Director, Intelligence and Targeting 
Australian Taxation Office 
Mr Bruce Quigley, Acting Commissioner of Taxation 
Mr Greg Williams, Deputy Commissioner, Serious Non-compliance 
Northern Territory Police, Fire and Emergency Services (via teleconference) 
Mr Reece Kershaw, Assistant Commissioner, Crime and Specialist Services 
New South Wales Police Force 
Mr David Hudson, Acting Deputy Commissioner, Specialist Operations 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
Mr Mark Geddes, Agency Intelligence Coordinator 
Queensland Police Service 
Ms Gayle Hogan, Acting Assistant Commissioner, State Crime Operations Command 
Detective Superintendent John Pointing, State Crime Operations Command 
South Australia Police 
Detective Chief Inspector Colin Cunningham, Acting Officer in Charge, State 
Intelligence Branch 
Western Australia Police 
Commander Alf Fordham, Director State Intelligence 
Tasmania Police 
Mr Scott Tilyard, Deputy Commissioner of Police 
Wednesday, 31 October 2012 – Canberra ACT 
Charles Sturt University 
Mr Patrick Walsh, Senior Lecturer, Intelligence and Security Studies 
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Thursday, 14 March 2013 – Canberra ACT 
Australian Crime Commission 
Mr John Lawler AM APM, Chief Executive Officer 
Mrs Karen Harfield, Executive Director, Fusion, Target Development and 
Performance 
Mr Paul Jevtovic APM, Executive Director, Intervention and Prevention 
Dr David Lacey, Executive Director, People, Business Support and Stakeholder 
Relations 
Mr Ben McDevitt AM APM, State Manager, Queensland 
